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"The historical and statistical study of tax records falls into a sort of academic
no mans land, too historical for economists and too economistic for historians.
Thomas Piketty (2014, 17)
Why study taxes in the Jazz Age? The federal income tax system has undergone numerous
changes since the 1920s, the period covered in this study. Recent events have brought this
period back into focus. In particular, income inequality in the 1920s and today are frequently
noted to be similar. The events leading up to the Great Recession of the late 2000s form an
unfortunate parallel with the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression.
Recently, Alan Krueger described the Great Gatsby curve as the positive correlation
between after-tax Gini coeﬃcients and economic mobility across countries (Krueger 2012).
One of the most popular books of 2014 explores the topic of income and wealth inequality
across countries and time periods (Piketty 2014). Piketty warns that increasing wealth
inequality, though greatly reduced between 1914 and 1945, is more an element of capitalism
than an accident:
1
When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and
income, as it did in the nineteenth century and seems quite likely to do again in
the twenty-ﬁrst, capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable
inequalities (Piketty 2014, 1).
Piketty proposes a global tax on capital and greatly increased progressive income taxes as a
remedy.
The Great Recession has left many calling for greater taxation on the one percent. But
nobody seems quite sure of who they are. They might be hardworking people whose ingenuity
brought them fame and fortune, like Henry Ford or Steve Jobs. They might be inheritors
who have used their advantages to perpetuate their wealth. They might be somewhere in
between. This dissertation investigates tax records of the top taxpaying class. I create a
new dataset on individuals paying high taxes, and use this data to present demographic
statistics and analyze tax response, as well as to comment on several other issues, including
the inheritance of high status and the earnings of superstars.
Chapter two describes the Revenue Act of 1924, one of several tax bills in the 1920s that
cut tax rates. However, the Revenue Act of 1924 is unique in that it allowed for publicity
of name, address, and tax payment. As a result, newspapers print tens of thousands of
names, addresses, and tax payments of those ﬁling returns in their area. Newspapers were
particularly interested in the highest tax payments. However, a tax payment of any size
indicated high status, as only 6.5-7 percent of the population even ﬁled tax returns, and
only about 4 percent paid tax on a return (Statistics of Income).
I trace the political passage of the Revenue Act of 1924 and its publicity provision. I
also investigate the participation of newspapers in major cities in printing names, addresses,
and tax payments. I look for the eﬀect of publicity in the distribution of tax returns across
2
income classes and states, and ﬁnd very little if any eﬀect.
Chapter three presents the description and formation of the data. I present the full
documentation of a 40,000 observation dataset on tax payments. I describe how I matched
names and payments from 1924 newspapers (for 1923 tax payments) and 1925 newspapers
(for 1924 payments) using an automated matching procedure. This task involved combining
a dataset of about 20,000 observations in one year with about 30,000 in another. The data
covers a set of taxpayers whose names were printed in the New York Times in 1924 and
1925. These taxpayers predominantly live in New York City or the surrounding area, but
the data for 1924 includes several major cities, while the data for 1923 includes major cities
whose collectors allowed newspapers to copy names out of their records. Very often, major
cities appear in both years.
Because names and addresses did not appear identically in each year, I used fuzzy match-
ing, where strings are compared for their similarity. Fuzzy matching is an iterative process
with several rounds of hand review and correction. As a contribution to the community, I
also release computer code and video tutorials on how to eﬃciently undertake similar match-
ing procedures. I also discuss using Ancestry.com to ﬁnd the top 400 taxpayers of 1924 in the
1920 and 1930 US Federal Census of the Population. Finally, I discuss further use of fuzzy
matching to link the dataset of 1923-1924 taxpayers to other lists of known wealthy people
or individuals with high tax payments. The result of this matching is a 40,411 observation
dataset with 200 variables, fully documented in chapter three. I will release this data after
a two year embargo.
Chapter four uses the dataset described in chapter three to ﬁgure out who the top tax-
payers are in 1924. I explicitly list the top ten and top hundred by name. I show a high
correlation between income rank and tax payment rank using data from 1928. I present a
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brief background on the top ten and the share of all federal individual income taxes paid
for the top 100. I ﬁnd the top 400, or the top 0.001 percent, in US Federal Census of
the Population records for 1920 and 1930. These Census records give information on age,
marital status, occupation, and in 1930, home value and veteran status. I provide summary
statistics on 1924's top 400. I also use datasets on large estates before 1921 and large tax
payments from 1928-1934 and 1936-1941 to comment on persistence of high status.
In chapter ﬁve, I use the 1923 and 1924 tax payments within New York City and the
immediately surrounding area to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). The elas-
ticity of taxable income, an important parameter in the study of public ﬁnance, indicates the
response of taxable income, and therefore tax collections, to changes in tax rates. At least
two other studies consider the ETI in the same time period using aggregate data and the
assumption of rank preservation. I use my data to show that rank preservation is probably
a fair assumption. I also compute similar estimates of the ETI using individual level data. I
conclude from these two results that these tax data are reliable.
Overall, these new data provide a unique view into the identities of those paying the
highest taxes in the US in the 1920s. These data form a valuable contribution to the





The United States Revenue Act of 1924 signiﬁcantly altered the federal personal income,
estate, and gift tax system of the interwar period. While there were many changes to
individual income tax rates, and the introduction of a gift tax, a unique aspect of the law
was its new publicity provision. The law required each Collector of Internal Revenue to
prepare reports listing the name, address, and tax payment of each tax ﬁler in their district
(districts ranged from covering only parts of major cities to covering entire small states),
and to make that report open to public inspection. Compliance with that requirement
varied, but many collectors released the list to all visitors, regardless of reason; some major
newspapers responded by printing the lists in their city. The actions of the Collectors of
Internal Revenue and the newspapers were controversial. While the legality of printing the
list in the newspaper was questionable, the records exist to this day on microﬁlm because of
that choice.
This chapter seeks to explain how that publicity provision came to be enacted. It also
5
provides a comparison for the tax system of 1924 and 1925 to the tax system that we know
today. The federal individual income tax of the 1920s is sometimes called a class tax rather
than a mass tax, meaning that the tax was collected only from very high earners.
2.2 Debate and Passage
2.2.1 Historical Context
A Note on Inﬂation Adjustments
Throughout this dissertation, I present unadjusted numbers from taxes in the 1920s. I
provide the table below as a reference in interpreting the numbers. According to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, the annual average CPI was 17.1 for both 1923 and 1924, and 232.957
in 2013. The ratio of these numbers is 13.62.
units 1923 1924 2013
CPI levels 17.2 17.2 229.32
Nominal GDP millions current dollars 86,238 87,786 16,797,500
Real GDP millions 2009 dollars 867,213 893,916 15,759,000
NGDP per capita millions current dollars 770.35 769.32 53,078.54
RGDP per capita millions 2009 dollars 7,746.6 7,833.9 49,797.0
$1 in 1923 current dollars $1 - $13.62
$1 in 1924 current dollars - $1 $13.62
Table 2.2.1: Inﬂation adjustments. Source: Measuring Worth (Williamson, 2014) and US
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014)
Tax Collections
First levied in 1913, the income tax underwent substantial changes as it moved into its
second decade. By 1924, as ﬁgure 2.2.1 shows, the income tax provided just under half of
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the government's $4 billion annual receipts.1
Figure 2.2.1: 1924 government receipts and expenditures (Annual Report 1925, 18-19)
Figure 2.2.2 shows that the income tax ballooned in size from 1916 to 1920, and that by
1923 and 1924, it had shrunk to a still elevated level around $2 billion annually.
1While the ﬁgure includes income and proﬁts tax, there was no proﬁts tax collected in 1923 or 1924.
I believe it is only left in for consistency with past annual reports that did include proﬁts tax in the last
decade, including the prior year.
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Figure 2.2.2: 1914-1924 government receipts (Annual Report 1925, 22)
However, when placed in context with ﬁgure 2.2.3, the amount of tax collections seems
too low in comparison with spending in prior ﬁscal years. If the surplus is the distance by
which the black bar exceeds the shaded bar, and the deﬁcit is the opposite, then it seems
clear that the surplus in the early 1920s is not enough to make any impact on the debt
accumulated from the deﬁcits of ﬁscal years 1918 and 1919.
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Figure 2.2.3: 1914-1924 government receipts and expenditures (Annual Report 1925, 21)
Figure 2.2.4 shows general trends in taxation from 1916-1929 in the United States. The
graph presents the statistics on the number of returns, the total taxable income and average
per return, and the total tax and average per return. I scale to the 1923 numbers and set
1923's values equal to 100. I present another graph in the appendix showing only the 1920s,
to exclude some of the variation from 1916-1919.
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Figure 2.2.4: Returns, income, taxes, and averages, US, 1916-1929. Source: Statistics of
Income.
Figure 2.2.4 tells a story of early expansion of the income tax. Originally a class tax,
the income tax exemption level fell in the late 1910s and introduced new taxpayers to the
revenue system.2 Taxed income and taxes increase with the number of returns, while the
2The minimum level of income at which paying tax is required.
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average tax and average income both fall; this makes sense, as those who were newly brought
in have lower incomes and pay lower taxes. In 1923-1924, the Republicans began their early
successes in revising the tax code more to their liking. The exemption increased for 1925,
causing about 45 percent of taxpayers to drop out of the taxpaying class. Average incomes
and taxes paid naturally increase dramatically, while the amount of tax paid grew, but stayed
relatively steady. This dissertation focuses on this period of early reform of the income tax.
Party Control of Congress
The Revenue Act of 1924 was debated and passed during the 68th United States Congress.
At the time of the vote on tax publicity, Republicans held the majority in the Senate,
with 51 members, while 43 Democrats served with 2 members of Farmer-Labor (Poole and
Rosenthal, 2013). In the House of Representatives, 226 Republicans were in the majority,
with 206 Democrats, 2 Farmer-Labor, and 1 Socialist in the minority.
2.2.2 Tax Rhetoric
At the time of its inception in 1913, the income tax had revenue goals as well as social goals.
In the opinion of W. E. Brownlee, Cordell Hull (D-TN), the author of the income tax, found
that revenue goals were far less important than the desire to use the tax to advance economic
justice (Brownlee 2000, 41). After enactment, Ways and Means Chairman Claude Kitchin
(D-NC) and the Democrats attacked concentrations of wealth, special privilege, and public
corruption (Brownlee 2000, 43). Other Democratic social goals sought through the income
tax were to break the hold of monopoly power on the stimulating forces of competition
(Brownlee 2000, 45), to pursue the ideal of using taxation to restructure the economy
according to 19th century liberal ideals (Brownlee 2000, 46), and to structure wartime
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public ﬁnance based on the taxation of assets that democratic statists regarded as ill gotten
and socially hurtful (Brownlee 2000, 46-47).
These early Democratic achievements occurred just ﬁve to ten years before the Repub-
licans began their tax cut plans and some Progressives began pushing for tax publicity.
Frequently, the rhetoric surrounding taxes from the Democrats and Progressives in the Re-
publican Party reﬂects the same vision of using the income tax to advance social goals.
Though nearly ninety years removed from these political battles, the Republican justiﬁ-
cations for tax cuts in the 1920s are the same as today's. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon
was a leading voice for tax cuts within the Coolidge administration. His book, Taxation: The
People's Business, written in 1924 during his tenure at the Treasury, laid out the case for
steep tax rate cuts. Mellon used the familiar arguments that tax cuts may increase revenue,
and that government should be run like a business:
It seems diﬃcult for some to understand that high rates of taxation do not
necessarily mean large revenue to the Government, and that more revenue may
often be obtained by lower rates ... The same rule applies to all private businesses
... The most outstanding recent example of this principle is the sales policy of
the Ford Motor Car Company. Does any one question that Mr. Ford has made
more money by reducing the price of his car and increasing his sales than he
would have made by maintaining a high price and a greater proﬁt per car, but
selling less cars? The Government is just a business, and can and should be run
on business principles (Mellon 1924, 16-17).
Mellon also imagined that high tax rates increase the attractiveness of tax avoidance or
evasion. He argued this while asserting that the country sat on the right side of the so-called
Laﬀer curve (though it did not have that name at the time), coupled with an appeal to
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common sense:
Experience has shown that the present high rates of surtax are bringing in each
year progressively less revenue to the Government. This means that the price is
too high to the large taxpayer and he is avoiding a taxable income by the many
ways which are available to him. What rates will bring in the largest revenue
to the Government experience has not yet developed, but it is estimated that by
cutting the surtaxes in half, the Government, when the full eﬀect of the reduction
is felt, will receive more revenue from the owners of large incomes at the lower
rates of tax than it would have received at the higher rates. This is simply an
application of the same business principle referred to above, just as Mr. Ford
makes more money out of pricing his cars at $380 than at $3,000 (Mellon 1924,
17).
Exactly who estimated the eﬀect of a surtax slash, and how, is not known. But despite writing
decades before the advent of rigorous empirical public ﬁnance analysis, Mellon grasped the
theory of tax incidence and its weak relation to tax remittance quite well:
High taxation, even if levied upon an economic basis, aﬀects the prosperity of
the country, because in its ultimate analysis the burden of all taxes rests only in
part upon the individual or property taxed. It is largely borne by the ultimate
consumer. High taxation means a high price level and high cost of living. A
reduction in taxes, therefore, results not only in an immediate saving to the
individual or property directly aﬀected, but an ultimate saving to all people in
the country. It can safely be said, that a reduction in the income tax reduces
expenses not only of the income taxpayers but of the entire 110,000,000 people
in the United States (Mellon 1924, 21).
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Economists were not in unanimous agreement with Secretary Mellon. Roy Blakey, Pro-
fessor of Economics, University of Minnesota, covered each new tax bill in the American
Economic Review. While Mellon argued that surtaxes were just a hair too high and if cut,
evasion would swiftly cease, Blakey countered,
The maximum rate would probably have to be cut to zero before stilling the
energetic ingenuity of some legal minds searching for holes, and even then the
mere game of it might continue to lead them on (Blakey 1924, 498).
And when tax rates were up for yet another cut in 1926, Blakey sarcastically noted that
All in all, the Revenue act of 1926 seems to be in line with what the majority of
the electorate voted for in the last election, not that all of them knew just what
they voted for as well as what they voted against... Mr. Mellon appears to have
got himself and us into a vicious circle from which there is no logical escape. The
more we reduce tax rates the greater prosperity and the greater the revenue for
the government. After the tax rates all reach zero, our revenues will be so great
that we can wipe out our billions of debt in a single year,- or could if Mr. Mellon
would quit tying us up with long-time maturities, -and our prosperity will be
even more than ever the envy of the rest of the world (Blakey 1926, 425).
The Senate was well aware of Mellon's arguments, even in 1921, the ﬁrst year of Mellon's
tenure at the Treasury. Mellon testiﬁed to the Finance Committee that high rates do not
raise as much as low rates, and some Senators read this into the record from the ﬂoor days
later:
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. President, I wish to ask the Senator- and I did not follow
him, perhaps, accurately-did the Secretary, or did he not, advise that we refrain
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from certain taxes because of these evasions?
Mr. LA FOLLETTE. He advised that we not only cut the surtaxes down to 32
per cent, but he said we had better cut them down to 25 per cent
Mr. SIMMONS. Exactly.
Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Because wealth will not pay. We will collect more-that is
what it meant-we will collect more at 25 per cent than we will at 32 per cent.
There is no question about what he said. I will read his testimony. The Senator
from California is anxious that I should take it up a little sooner than I had
intended. I was coming to it in an orderly way.
...
Mr. REED. Not only was the suggestion made that the taxes should be reduced
in many respects, but the chief reason advanced was that more money would be
raised by a lower tax than by the present rates.
Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes; because they would not stand the higher tax; they
would not pay it. (Congressional Record 1921, 7368)
Not only did the senators know that Mellon had this view, but some believed this early
supply-side argument to be a fundamental truth:
Mr. PENROSE. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me, I do not want
to interject myself into this controversy, but I do not hesitate to state that the
Secretary of the Treasury will be entirely willing to stand by any statement he
has made; that he stated fundamental truths, admitted by every economist and
student of these questions, and with a mind undistorted by hysteria or swayed by
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demagogism; and any statement that he has made before the Finance Committee-
and I think I heard all of them-he will doubtless be willing to repeat or reaﬃrm
anywhere that the occasion may call for. (Congressional Record 1921, 7368)
Tax-exempt securities
In the early years of the federal income tax, there was concern over investment in tax-free
securities as a vehicle to escape income taxation. Progressives thought that very wealthy
citizens would invest nearly all of their money in state or municipal bonds, and by doing
so, avoid the eﬀect of any income tax. It certainly seemed unfair to the progressives that
wealthy people could avoid tax; whether they had already paid a hefty tax bill on the income
that they were now investing, or the eﬀect of high demand on the return of these bonds,
were both irrelevant.
Robert La Follette Sr. (R-WI) proposed an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1921 that
would begin to attack the problems he saw in tax-free securities. The amendment required
each person with tax-free bonds to report the number and amount that they held, as well as
interest on those bonds, on their tax return. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue would
then be required to compile this information both in the aggregate as well as classiﬁed by
type of bond or net income of the owner.
La Follette felt that it was a fundamental principle of any just system of taxation that
wealth shall pay its proportionate share of the burdens of government (Congressional Record
1921, 7364). He stated that so little was known about tax-exempt bonds; that the amount
of them in circulation was not known, but estimated to be between $14 and $20 billion.
Nobody in opposition chose to debate this amendment, and it passed, 38-11, with 47 not
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voting.3 The Democrats voted 16-0 in favor, with 20 Democrats not voting. The Republicans
voted 22-11 in favor, with 27 not voting.
Andrew Mellon did not debate La Follette's arguments regarding fairness. He supported
eﬀorts to know more about who holds tax-exempt bonds, but doubted that the rich were
holding them in large numbers:
Generally what is referred to as the chief factor is the investment in tax-free
securities. That is not so. The investment in tax-free securities is a large factor,
but it is not the leading factor. There are many other methods. For instance,
from my knowledge of incomes in business, etc., of individuals, I do not know
among them any who to any large extent invest in tax-free securities, for the
reason that they have not the free cash with which to do it. They are generally
people who are in industrial line of business, and they have to carry on their
business, and they need their capital. They can not get it out to invest it in
tax-free securities. I do not think that is the largest item.
For instance, I know of a man who has a large income, a very high income. He
invested in a piece of real estate. It was coal property. It cost about $4,000,000.
But the point is that in the meantime the Government has relieved him. Instead
of paying 6 per cent he is paying 2.5 per cent to carry that property, because
the interest he pays is deductible from income, and he gets that deduction which
relieves him to that extent.
Senator REED. He does not work his coal ﬁeld?
Secretary MELLON. No; It is just standing there.
3Of course, in the Senate, the majority is the majority of those who are voting, so only 25 votes are
needed for passage if 49 are voting (38+11) and the 47 not voting are irrelevant.
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Senator REED. Why could not that be reached by a proper clause in the law?
Secretary MELLON. That could be reached- but you can keep on putting proper
clauses in and reaching something and then something else. That is just one
instance. There are all kinds of ways, and the people who resort to them are
within their rights in doing it. They avoid taxes by making investments. It is
human nature, and you can not change human nature. (Congressional Record
1921, 7369)
La Follette's reply was that Mellon and Congress should at least try to stop tax avoidance
through tax free securities or other means.4
The results of this report can be found in the Statistics of Income for 1924. 75 people
ﬁle tax returns with $1 million and over in net income, and those same people have just
over $150 million in net income, pay just under $50 million in tax, and have $10 million in
interest from tax-exempt bonds. Overall, tax-exempt bonds pay $238 million in interest in
1924 to those ﬁling taxes.
The House Ways & Means Committee held hearings in 1922 on the issue of tax-exempt
bonds. The committee faced four resolutions proposing constitutional amendments that
would allow for taxation of all securities. In the hearings, it is quite clear that both politicians
and economists knew that tax-exempt securities would be highly valued by the wealthy and
would pay lower interest rates than taxable securities (Ways and Means 1922, 5). The Ways
and Means Committee wrote a new resolution calling for a constitutional amendment after
these hearings, and despite the committee's support and the support of several academic
4That attitude, if carried throughout the ﬁeld of legislation, would mean the end of law and the beginning
of anarchy. It would mean that wherever we ﬁnd an individual or corporation strong enough or cunning
enough to evade a law, that law should be repealed, or made so ineﬀective in its restrictions that the violator
would not object to its existence (Congressional Record 1921, 7369)
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and professional associations, no such amendment was ever adopted.
2.2.3 Congressional tax rate debate
The early income tax featured both a normal tax and a surtax. The surtax was an additional
tax upon net income at speciﬁed rates. Most deductions counted against the normal tax
obligation but not the surtax obligation. Due to the need for revenues to fund the war eﬀort,
the War Revenue Act of October, 1917 greatly increased surtax rates from a maximum of 13
percent to a maximum of 63 percent. This increased surtax was placed most heavily upon
incomes in excess of $100,000. In 1918, the surtax rates were increased across the board,
but the increase in surtax rates across incomes was made much more linear. The Revenue
Act of 1921 was a ﬁrst attempt at cutting high wartime surtax rates. By 1923, when the
Revenue Act of 1921 was still in force, the top surtax rate was 50 percent, and normal tax
rates were 4 percent on the ﬁrst $4000 and 8 percent on incomes above that.
On November 10, 1923, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon sent a letter to William Green
(R-IA), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The letter outlined Mellon's
proposed changes to tax law for what would become the Revenue Act of 1924. Mellon called
for a cut in normal tax rates from 4 and 8 percent to 3 and 6 percent, and a cut in surtax
rates from 50 percent at the top to 25 percent at the top. Mellon also wanted the surtax
rates to start at $10,000 rather than $6,000.
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Date in 1924 Event and coverage
Jan. 4 Chairman Green releases Mellon letter; front page coverage
Feb. 5 House Ways and Means Committee approves Mellon plan, front
page
Feb. 11 Ways and Means Committee presents four reports on bill, front
page
Feb. 15 House Republicans drop Mellon plan, adjust max. surtax rate
to 35 percent, front page
Feb. 29 House passes bill (408-8) with 37.5 percent surtax maximum
(25 percent cut of all surtax rates), publicity to certain
congressional committees (Ways and Means, Finance, and
special congressional committees), front page
March 12 Mellon speaks on bill, mentions his opposition to
committee publicity, page 4
April 12 Senate Finance Committee Chairman Smoot brings Mellon
plan to Senate ﬂoor, front page
May 2 Senate votes for complete publicity (Norris amendment), 48-27,
front page
May 10 Senate passes bill with 40 percent surtax maximum, front page
May 16 Conference underway, members sworn to secrecy, publicity
debated, front page
May 21 Conference agrees on publicity to take the form of lists posted
in each collection district of name, address, and payment, and
agrees on Senate tax rates, front page
May 22 Mellon disapproves of bill, rumored to encourage veto,
Congressional leaders dismiss possibility, front page
May 24 Senate approves conference bill 60-6, front page
May 26 House passes conference bill 376-9, Mellon indicates reluctant
acceptance, front page
June 2 Coolidge signs the bill while asking future sessions of Congress
to repeal publicity, front page
Table 2.2.2: Newspaper Coverage of Bill in Congress. Source: The New York Times, dates
in 1924, January 5, February 6, February 12, February 16, March 1, March 13, April 13,
May 3, May 11, May 17, May 22, May 23, May 25, May 27, June 3
On January 5, 1924, the New York Times devoted three pages, including part of the
cover, to explaining Mellon's proposed tax law changes. Also on the cover was a story that
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Calvin Coolidge, then president, would refuse to accept any compromise on the surtax rates
proposed by Mellon. It seems that Coolidge was satisﬁed with a small compromise, as he
eventually signed a compromise bill on June 2, 1924 that only reduced surtax rates from
50 to 40 percent (maximum). The same article provides a brieﬁng on the deliberations of
the House Ways and Means Committee on the previous day. In fact, the New York Times
frequently covered proceedings in the Congress and occasionally ran the text of proposed
new or amended sections in the legislation. Due to this coverage, it seems that high-income
taxpayers would have been very aware of proposed tax law changes after early 1924. Coolidge
had threatened a veto, but it should be noted that the conference bill passed each house of
Congress with more than a 2/3 majority.
Perhaps surprisingly, Coolidge issued a statement along with his signature of the bill that
indicated his displeasure with both the surtax rates and the failure to pass a resolution for a
Constitutional amendment to abolish tax-exempt securities (Blakey and Blakey 1940, 246).
Throughout the interwar era, there had been a debate over whether tax evasion was due to
high rates or the sheltering of income in tax-exempt securities (it was generally agreed that
evasion was rampant). The position of Coolidge's own party and his Treasury secretary was
that high rates alone were the cause of evasion. For more on this debate, see Smiley and
Keehn (1995).
2.2.4 Publicity debate
Some progressives felt that income tax publicity might lessen income tax evasion. Blakey
notes that [t]he usual discussion of publicity of income tax returns was injected into the
debate by Frear. His amendment to make returns public records was defeated in the House
(Blakey and Blakey 1940, 234). The placement of the word usual indicates that this was
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not the ﬁrst attempt at publicity. While publicity was a feature of the 1909 corporation
excise tax, the law also speciﬁed that anyone who shared tax return information without
authorization from the President would face a ﬁne or jail time (Blakey and Blakey 1940, 54).
Immediately after passing his tax-exempt securities amendment, La Follette introduced an
amendment to make returns open to public inspection during the debate over the Revenue
Act of 1921 in the Senate, but it was defeated (Blakey and Blakey, 1940 216). However,
the Senate adopted without any objection the amendment of Norris to provide publicity
of income tax returns (Blakey and Blakey, 1940 242). The Norris amendment called for
each return to be a public record. Since the House did pass an amendment to permit
certain committees of Congress to call on the Secretary of the Treasury for returns or for
data contained in returns, (Blakey and Blakey, 1940 234) and the Senate bill contained the
Norris publicity amendment, the diﬀerences had to be resolved in committee. The conference
committee bill followed the House bill for the most part, but added that each collector should
prepare and make available for the public a list containing the name, address, and tax of
each person making an income tax return (Blakey and Blakey, 1940 245). Despite veto
threats, President Coolidge did sign the bill enacting the tax rates for 1924 and beyond on
June 2, 1924.
La Follette felt that tax publicity would have a real and positive eﬀect on the number
of tax returns and the amount of income returned. He used the Civil War-era tax system,
which featured publicity, as his example, as well as state level evidence from North Carolina:
In 1870, when the returns were published, the number showing incomes over
$2,000 were 94,887. In 1871, when publicity was prohibited, the number fell to
74,000-that is, from 94,000 to 74,000; then to 72,000 in 1872, and this in spite
of the fact that, as shown by individual bank deposits, bank clearings, and so
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forth, 1871. and 1872 were more prosperous years than 1870. Similarly in North
Carolina, when the income-tax returns under the State law were published by the
Hon. Josephus Daniels in his paper, the News and Observer, the tax collections
immediately more than doubled.
With the secrecy of returns, it is impossible to collect the tax eﬃciently without
an extravagantly expensive army of revenue agents and the creation of a sys-
tem of espionage that would be extremely distasteful to the American people
(Congressional Record 1921, 7372).
La Follette also pointed out that a high-ranking Treasury oﬃcial had recently been arrested
for accepting a bribe. Senator Augustus Stanley (D-KY) argued that tax secrecy gave
bureaucrats power that would certainly be abused.5 La Follette agreed, even going on to
say that publicity makes the law almost self-administrative (Congressional Record 1921,
7373). There were not many arguments against publicity presented by opponents in 1921.
Nonetheless, La Follette's 1921 amendment for tax returns in their entirety to be public
records went down, 33-35, with 28 not voting. On this vote, the majority Republicans voted
9 for and 35 against, with 16 not voting, and the Democrats voted 24-0 in favor, with 10 not
voting, and two paired yeas (Poole and Rosenthal, 2013).
In 1924, Senator George Norris (R-NE) led the charge for publicity of tax returns, as
Senator La Follette was absent due to illness. The majority of discussion in support was
that publicity would root out those who were evading taxes, while the majority of discussion
in opposition claimed that publicity would cause suspicion, snooping, and general harassment
5To give to any bureau of the Government the right to know and to keep the political sins of powerful
citizens is to place in the hands of any man who is desirous or ambitious enough to do it an instrument of
political blackmail that in times past has been used by men almost as high in oﬃce as the President of the
United States himself. That is an open secret (Congressional Record 1921, 7373).
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for those with high income taxes. Additionally, opponents argued that publicity would reveal
trade secrets and expose vulnerabilities in businesses.
Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) oﬀered a similar amendment, and went immediately on the
attack against opponents of publicity. One of McKellar's ﬁrst remarks was to point out
that seven (then eight, then nine) senators who previously voted against publicity lost re-
election, while only who voted in favor of publicity lost (Congressional Record 1924, 7682).
McKellar and Senator George McLean (R-CT) diﬀered on whether other states or nations
had publicity of tax returns; both McKellar and McLean oﬀered contradictory information
on which nations or US states had publicity (Congressional Record 1924, 7683).
McLean argued that since Wisconsin had recently allowed for secrecy in state tax returns,
that the votes of the senators of Wisconsin should be a measure of the popularity of publicity
in Wisconsin. A reference to the Congressional Record from 1921 showed that the Wisconsin
senators split their votes on publicity. Norris claimed that due to ﬂoor statements, it could
be assumed that both Wisconsin senators supported publicity, though both were absent
for illness that day (Congressional Record 1924, 7687). Senator Royal Copeland (D-NY)
summarized the thoughts of several senators when he said that every oﬃcial act performed
by any governmental body should be an open and public act... there is no reason why any
exception should be made as regards income taxes (Congressional Record 1924, 7688). After
a long, puzzling, and often nonsensical debate, the Norris amendment for every return to be
a public record passed, 48-27, with 21 not voting (Congressional Record 1924, 7692). On
this vote, the majority Republicans voted 14-25, with 11 not voting, and one paired yea.
Democrats voted 32-2 in favor, with 9 not voting. Both Farmer-Labor senators voted in
favor (Poole and Rosenthal, 2013).
While the Senate bill made all returns public records, the conference committee bill only
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allowed for the revelation of names, addresses, and tax payments. This is what allowed for
the printing of this information in newspapers that is explored in the later chapters of this
dissertation.
The question of publicity was again revisited in 1926. As the Revenue Act of 1926
did not contain publicity when it came out of committee, Senator Norris again ﬂoated his
public records amendment in identical form. Norris, Clarence Dill (D-WA), and David
Reed (R-PA) openly considered the idea that the conference committee included name-
address-payment publicity in order to come up with the most unpopular form of publicity
possible (Congressional Record 1926, 3484). Norris again asserted that publicity would
increase revenue, arguing that the amount of taxable income would rise as the number of
eyes reviewing the claim rose (Congressional Record 1926, 3491). Furthermore, if somebody
was not evading taxes, they supposedly had nothing to hide, and that complete public
records would help those honest taxpayers to receive refunds where they had made mistakes
(Congressional Record 1926, 3492). Norris and allies even conceded that the present law
of name-address-payment publicity served no useful purpose (Congressional Record 1926,
3495).6 Senator Dill spoke at length that the country had not had real publicity, that
publicity has done no harm, and that lowering surtaxes lowers receipts from [the] wealthy
(Congressional Record 1926, 3512-3513).
After another very lengthy debate, the Norris amendment failed by a vote of 32-49, with
6Mr. NORRIS: Mr. President, I want to say a word on that subject. It did not give any real information.
I think that is the only objection to it. If the Senator made his return and it showed on the face of it that he
paid an income tax of $1,000, that would not be any real information. There is nothing in that information
to indicate whether he has covered up anything or whether he has been dishonest or honest. In other words,
the information that was given could be used for the purpose of bringing about a misunderstanding on the
part of the public because it did not give suﬃcient information to really tell anything. A man may be a very
wealthy man and his income may be very small. He may be perfectly honest and his return will show that
he is perfectly honest and square. On the other hand, he may not return nearly all of his property, and if
nobody ever has an opportunity to ﬁnd it out, that situation will never be corrected. That is what I am
trying to cure by my amendment. (Congressional Record 1926, 3489)
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15 not voting. Participation was high on this day, as only seven members did not vote. The
Republicans voted 15-33, with four not voting, and four paired votes. The Democrats voted
16-16, with four pairs and three not voting. The one Farmer-Labor senator voted aye. Of
the 32 Democrats voting for publicity in 1924, 13 voted for publicity again in 1924, while 10
voted against, with ﬁve not in the Senate anymore, two not voting, and two paired votes. Of
the two who had voted against publicity in 1924, one was no longer in the Senate, and the
other voted against publicity again in 1926. The nine Democrats who did not vote in 1924
split 1-5, with two paired votes and one no longer in the Senate. The explanation here seems
to be that the strong Democratic force for publicity vanished by 1926, with only 13 of the
original 32 still voting for publicity, and 5 of 6 new members who took a side opting against
publicity. Among the 14 Republicans who voted aye in 1924, 10 still vote aye in 1924, one
votes against, one pairs a vote, one does not vote, and one is not in the Senate. Of the 25
who voted against publicity in 1924, none vote aye, while 18 remain against, with one not
voting, one paired vote, and ﬁve no longer in the Senate.
1924: for 1924: against paired not voting not in Senate total
1926: for 13 0 0 1 2 16
1926: against 10 1 0 5 0 16
paired 2 0 0 2 0 4
not voting 2 0 0 0 1 3
not in Senate 5 1 0 1 0 7
total 32 2 0 9 3 46
Table 2.2.3: Democrats voting on publicity, 1924 and 1926
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1924: for 1924: against paired not voting not in Senate total
1926: for 10 0 0 2 3 15
1926: against 1 18 0 4 10 33
paired 1 1 0 0 2 4
not voting 1 1 0 1 1 4
not in Senate 1 5 1 4 0 11
total 14 25 1 11 16 67
Table 2.2.4: Republicans voting on publicity, 1924 and 1926
In total, eleven senators voted for publicity in 1924 and against in 1926. These senators
were primarily Southern and Democratic. This group included both senators from Virginia,
Mississippi, and North Carolina, as well as one senator from each of Louisiana, Maryland,
Georgia, Oklahoma (the Republican, John Harreld), and New York (Royal Copeland). This
is the same Royal Copeland who spoke in 1924 very forcefully that every act of government
should be public, taxes included.7 He did appear in the New York Times list of taxpayers
in both years. In 1923, the newspaper lists Royal S. Copeland at 58 Central Park West with
a tax payment of $1,311. In 1924, he appears as R. S. Copeland, at 250 West 57th, and a
payment of $1,273.
In the end, the Revenue Act of 1926 contained a provision for publicity that was nearly
identical in wording to the 1924 provision, except that it no longer allowed for payments to
be publicized. Name and address remained available, but were much less interesting on their
own. Therefore, tax publicity was eﬀectively repealed with the Revenue Act of 1926. This
was written into the bill's ﬁrst draft, so there is no ﬂoor vote on the question of name-address
publicity to compare against tax payment publicity.
The key issue here is what taxpayers knew, and when. The timeline of events in 1924
7It is also the same Royal Copeland who graduated from and was professor at University of Michigan
Medical School, and served as mayor of Ann Arbor.
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indicates that publicity became part of the Senate bill on May 2, 1924. The conference bill
also includes publicity and passed in late May, 1924. On June 2, 1924, the Revenue Act
of 1924, including publicity, became law. 1924 tax payments were due on March 15, 1925,
so taxpayers were aware for about nine months that their name, address, and tax payment
would be made public.
2.2.5 The Tax Code in 1924
The early federal personal income tax system featured both a normal tax and a surtax.
Despite connotations, the surtax collected orders of magnitude more revenue than the normal
tax. The normal tax had three brackets: $0 to $4,000, $4,000 to $8,000, and over $8,000, all
in amounts over total deductions and credits. The marginal tax rates for these brackets were
2, 4, and 6 percent, respectively. The surtax, however, began at $10,000 with a marginal
tax rate of 1 percent, and increased incrementally to a top rate of 40 percent on net incomes
over $500,000. Surtax brackets up to $100,000 were usually $2,000 apart, with an increase of
1 percent for each bracket. The surtax rate at $100,000 was 37 percent. Additional bracket
lines were drawn at $200,000, $300,000, and $500,000.
Net income, deﬁned as gross income minus credits and deductions, was used to compute
the tax liability. Gross income included a laundry list of sources, ending with or gains or
proﬁts and income derived from any source whatever (Revenue Act of 1924). Gross income
does not include life insurance, the value of gifts or bequests, interest upon state or local
government bonds, or a few other small exemptions. Section 214 of the Revenue Act lists
a number of deductions, including charitable contributions, business expenses, interest on
debts, percentage depletion for oil and gas wells, depreciation, and government contributions.
Section 216 allows additional credits for the normal tax only; these include dividends, interest
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on federal bonds, and a personal exemption.8 The personal exemption was $1,000 for a single
person, or $2,500 for married couples or heads of households. There was also a $400 credit
per dependent. The following table shows the breakdown of returns and net income by
family ﬁling status.







4,505,729 3,991,551 16,762,983,344 16,695,378,477
percent 58.8 54.3 68.2 65.7
Men, head 413,682 394,201 1,191,732,079 1,227,022,356
percent 5.4 5.4 4.8 4.8
Women, head 157,669 153,279 449,677,714 445,184,828
percent 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8
Men, other 1,697,031 1,865,258 3,633,625,088 4,223,496,529
percent 22.1 25.4 14.8 16.6
Women, other 718,080 773,314 1,690,728,371 1,883,756,919
percent 9.4 10.5 6.9 7.4
Separate returns
of wives
170,573 173,225 849,072,012 955,000,745
percent 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.8
Total 7,662,764 7,350,828 24,577,818,608 25,429,839,854
Table 2.2.5: Tax returns and income by ﬁling status
The gift tax was introduced in 1924, but repealed in the next tax bill in 1926. Levied over
ﬁfteen brackets, the gift tax started at 1 percent for gifts up to $50,000, slowly increased to
a marginal rate of 6 percent on gifts over $250,000, and increased from there to a marginal
rate of 40 percent on gifts over $10 million. In addition to a repeal in 1926, the Revenue Act
of 1926 retroactively refunded about half of the gift taxes paid.
8The term credit here has the same connotation as today's deduction; in other words, it is not sub-
tracted from the tax liability, but subtracted from the taxable income.
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The estate tax featured the same rates in 1924 as the gift tax, but with a $50,000
exemption. Similarly to the gift tax, the estate tax was greatly reduced and rebated in 1926.
The brackets of this ex-post rebate were also the same as the gift tax's ex-post revision.
However, the estate tax continues to be levied into the future from 1926, unlike the gift tax.
Taxes were due on March 15 of the following year, so in this case, 1923 and 1924's taxes
would have been due on March 15 of 1924 and 1925, respectively. Additionally, taxpayers
were allowed to pay in four quarterly installments, without interest. There was no withhold-
ing in this period, except for a small number of nonresident aliens.
Tax Complexity
The IRS form 1040 of today bears a striking resemblance to the 1040 collected by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1924 and 1925. The familiar numbered lines and sometimes
unexplained arithmetic manipulation are ubiquitous. The ﬁrst page (of two) appears in the
appendix.
However, the key insight into the complexity of the tax code in 1924 and 1925 is the
length of the instructions. While today's 1040 has over 200 pages of instructions, with
frequent references to IRS publications for even further explanation, the instructions in 1924
were only two pages. Those two pages were certainly typed with small font, but the clarity
of the language is hard to dispute. The ﬁrst of two pages appears in the appendix.
2.2.6 Timeline
A timeline of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1924 appears earlier. By early 1924, par-
ticularly February 29, when the House voted 408-8 on the Revenue Act of 1924, it was clear
that tax rates will be substantially lower in 1924 than they were in 1923. In early May, the
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Senate passed a similar bill, and by early June, the bill had become law.
As mentioned previously, taxes are paid diﬀerently in this time period. There was no
broad withholding in 1924; income was earned during the year, the tax bill was calculated
after the conclusion of the full year, and the ﬁrst of four interest free installments was due on
March 15. When taxpayers read on March 1, 1924 that the House voted to cut surtax rates
by 25 percent, they know that the tax rate on their previous two months and upcoming ten
months of income will very likely be reduced. They also know that it does not aﬀect the
payment that is due in two weeks, on March 15, 1924, on 1923's taxes.
When they read about tax publicity passing through the Senate on May 2, 1924, they
are not aware of whether it applies to the payments that they made by March 15, 1924,
for 1923's taxes. But they were certainly not aware of tax publicity at all when they made
tax payments by March 15, 1924. For the ﬁrst four months of 1924, they very likely do not
anticipate that their name, address, and tax payment will be made public. For the month of
May, they may anticipate that their information will be made public, and by June 2, 1924,
upon the bill's signing, they deﬁnitely know that their information will be made public. If a
taxpayer wanted to manipulate their 1924 income due to publicity, then they only had the
last seven to eight months of 1924 to do so- not the whole year. Taxpayers very likely could
not manipulate their 1923 income due to publicity.
Throughout 1925, newspaper readers are seeing stories about the unpopularity of tax
disclosure. Republicans are determined to overturn publicity at their ﬁrst opportunity. They
do so in February, 1926. If a taxpayer was choosing to ﬁle a 1925 tax return in March, 1926
with a lower (or higher) tax payment due to publicity, then (at least) two things are possible.
The ﬁrst is that the taxpayer's true income was unaﬀected, and so the 1925 tax return is
treated the same in the end as any other year's tax return. This might happen if the
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taxpayer always planned to amend the return with the true income after newspapers had
ﬁnished printing tax information; there is some anecdotal evidence for this. If, however, the
taxpayer's true income was aﬀected by disclosure, then 1925 tax information is aﬀected by
publicity even though the information was never revealed.
2.3 Publication
The Revenue Act of 1924, section 257(b) reads that
The Commissioner shall as soon as practicable in each year cause to be prepared
and made available to public inspection in such manner as he may determine,
in the oﬃce of the collector in each internal-revenue district and in such other
places as he may determine, lists containing the name and the post-oﬃce address
of each person making an income-tax return in such district, together with the
amount of the income tax paid by such person.
while section 3167 reads that
it shall be unlawful for any person to print or publish in any manner whatever
not provided by law any income return, or any part thereof or source of income,
proﬁts, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return; and any oﬀense
against the foregoing provision shall be a misdemeanor and be punished by a ﬁne
not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, at the
discretion of the court.
Interpretation and compliance with these provisions varied by local Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue collection oﬃces. In October 1924, several local Collectors of Internal Revenue (heads
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of local oﬃces of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor to the IRS) ordered their
staﬀs to make their records available for public inspection. Some other Collectors forbade
their staﬀs from opening books to inspection, while others required a legitimate reason for
inspection. A frequent method of enforcing the good reason standard was to require the
inquirer to provide both a name and a correct address for any income tax payer that they
sought information on. In this way, inquiries for all names with over $1,000 in tax payments
and the like could be easily refused. In some cases, lists were allowed to be copied in their
entirety, while in others, copying any information whatsoever was prohibited.
In October 1924, major newspapers, including the New York Times, New York Herald
Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, and many others, began running lists of tens
of thousands of names, addresses, and 1923 tax payments for both individuals and corpora-
tions. Despite confusion at the time, this was probably expected, since Coolidge noted his
displeasure with the publicity provision in his response to the new law, and the text was
printed in major newspapers (New York Times, June 3, 1924). Major newspapers again ran
tens of thousands of names and addresses, this time with 1924 tax payments, in September
of 1925. A contemporary account of the mayhem can be found in Atwood (1926).
Not all newspapers were eager to print names. The Minneapolis Morning Tribune was
one which fervently opposed publicity. On their front page of October 25, 1924, a box
appeared at the top with the heading, No Aid for Snoopers. Stating that legal permission
for printing tax payments is a matter of indiﬀerence, they boldly note that the Minneapolis
Morning Tribune will NOT print them.
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Figure 2.3.1: Minneapolis Morning Tribune states that they will not run names to avoid
helping the snoopers.
The Tribune held to its moral high ground in 1925 and refrained again from printing
names. However, it is certainly curious that the Tribune printed the names and contribution
amounts of many local charitable givers just mere inches to the left of its No Aid for
Snoopers box. Not only that, but the Tribune and papers like it would often run information
on the dates, locations, and attendance of private high society parties, the dates that young
students would leave for college, every marriage license ﬁling, and the passengers arriving
and departing in local harbors. Certainly newspapers provided plenty of information for
snoopers aside from tax payments.
The legality of newspaper publishing remained unclear until May 1925, after the books
for 1923 taxes had closed to public view. Commissioner of Internal Revenue David Blair
did not order the local Collectors to either open or close their books to public inspection.
Attorney General Harlan Stone, along with Assistant Attorney General James Beck, stated
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that they would take a test case on publicity to the federal court system, and that in the
meantime, newspapers publishing tax payment information did so at their own risk. This
was enough of a scare to keep many newspapers from publishing information.
The Justice Department chose the Kansas City Star and Baltimore Post as their targets,
despite many better funded newspapers volunteering to be defendants. The Supreme Court
sided with the newspapers, 8-0, with Harlan Stone, at this point elevated to Associate
Justice, recusing himself from both cases. In brief, the Court's argument noted that obtaining
tax information at the Collector oﬃce was in fact a manner provided by law, and that
arguments about the relative wisdom of publicity or secrecy were to be settled by Congress.
This case, United States v. Dickey, argued April 16 and 17, 1925, and decided May 25,
1925, came too late to allow newspapers which had played it safe to run any names and
tax payments from 1923, as the books were no longer open. But there was certainly far
more newspaper printing of tax information in September 1925 than the previous year. In
addition, the Collector oﬃces were under pressure to cooperate with journalists seeking
names. The picture below from the Baltimore Post of September 2, 1925, succinctly shows
the new attitude toward newspaper publication in 1925.9
9The caption reads: An elaborate organization was built by The Post to give its readers the most complete
list of income tax payments published in Baltimore. Photo shows a temporary oﬃce, with special telephone
wires running directly to The Post Building, which was opened at 35 S. Gay-st. Sheets of payments copied
from the U. S. internal revenue books by a staﬀ of Post reporters were rushed to this oﬃce by messenger boys
and then, after inspection, relayed to The Post Building by telephone and messengers. The Post published
more returns and published them earlier than any other Baltimore paper yesterday. This service will be
continued for several days.
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Figure 2.3.2: Baltimore Post reporters in the Collector's oﬃce.
While the ﬁrst year of inspection was marked by confusion and an inconsistent national
interpretation of the publicity clauses, the experience with publicity in 1925 was much
smoother. This may provide an explanation for why more taxpayer names appeared in
newspapers in 1925 than 1924, though the number of taxpayers paying above certain thresh-
olds used by the newspapers was lower.
I searched Library of Congress records for newspapers in the top 50 cities by 1920 Census
population, and reviewed those newspapers in the appropriate date range to see if they
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printed names and tax payments. In the appendix, I present a complete table of those
newspapers, with information on whether they print names and payments in each year,
whether the payments are local or only in other cities, whether the paper takes an ideological
stance against printing names or the Collector's oﬃce in that town does not release them, and
the political aﬃliation of the newspaper. I also present ﬁgures on the division of newspapers
by aﬃliation and printing names in each year. In general, about half of the newspapers
that did not print names in 1924 (of 1923 taxpayers) began to print them in 1925, while
nearly all newspapers that printed names in 1924 printed again in 1925. Papers identiﬁed
as Independent, Ind. Dem., or Democratic were much more likely to run names than those
aﬃliated as Republican or Ind. Rep. However, there is not a large and random sample of
newspapers in each city; in most cities, there are only a small number of newspapers on ﬁle,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































print in 1924 percent do not print in 1924 percent
print local in 1923 16 88.9 2 11.1
percent 37.2 5.9
do not print local in 1923 27 45.8 32 54.2
percent 62.8 94.1
Table 2.3.3: Number of newspapers printing tax payments in 1923 and 1924
Figure 2.3.3: Newspapers printing 1924 payments by aﬃliation
Interest in the lists
While many newspapers were diligent in preparing lists of names to run, there are reports
that curious citizens showed up at the Collectors' oﬃces as well. The New York Times
claimed on October 25, 1924 that newspaper reporters dominated the early turnout in New
York oﬃces after the ﬁrst day of inspection. On October 26, the New York Times reported
45
that less than a dozen individuals showed up at the Custom House and at the Third District
oﬃce. Of those who did show up, the newspaper said that there were ﬁve women seeking
information on the incomes of their current or future husbands. There was also a story of
investment bankers scanning the newspaper lists from 9 to 11 in the morning for a list of
business prospects.
The Baltimore American, on the other hand, noted that the Collector of Internal Rev-
enue's oﬃce in Baltimore was swamped within an hour of opening on the ﬁrst day of
publicity (Baltimore American, October 25, 1924). Galen Tait, the Baltimore Collector of
Internal Revenue, was clearly not amused with the proceedings in his oﬃce. According to
the October 27, 1924 Baltimore Sun, Tait placed information seekers into four categories,
ordered in terms of his perceived legitimacy of their claims on information. Tait viewed fam-
ily and government agents as the most legitimate, along with lawyers and bankers involved
with particular clients. The least legitimate included salespeople or business competitors.
Tait stated that only the ﬁrst group was likely to see any information, and that he reserved
the right to compile his own list of those who sought information with the name that they
investigated, and to make that list public to newspapers (Baltimore Sun, October 27, 1924).
Other cities' Collectors also required information to be requested by name and address, to
prevent the curious and to keep the workload in the oﬃce down. Mabel Reinecke, Chicago's
Collector, instituted such a rule after 300 people visited the oﬃce and 5,000 called in with
requests (Minneapolis Morning Tribune, October 26, 1924). While most newspapers reported
that there were at least a handful of businessmen or wives seeking information at the oﬃces,
the story in the San Francisco Chronicle of October 26, 1924, tells a diﬀerent story.
Despite the fact that income tax ﬁles... have been thrown open to the public for
the past two days, no private citizen has attempted to pry into the index of the
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ﬁnancial standing of his neighbor, according to Collector John P. McLaughlin.
So far there have been a few timid telephone calls from anonymous sources, in
which the Collector has been asked how one may go about ﬁnding out how much
income tax was paid by such and such a person? but otherwise the public is not
as curious as it is accused of being, McLaughlin said.
Many newspapers printed editorials taking sides on tax publicity. The Baltimore Post com-
piled a set of newspaper editorials by political leanings of the newspaper, and not surprisingly,
the Democratic newspapers were ﬁne with publicity, while the Republican papers ﬁercely
opposed it. Perhaps the most entertaining editorial came from the Minneapolis Morning
Tribune, which dripped with sarcasm on October 25, 1924. The editorial pointed out the
positive outcome that gossip would become more accurate, and went on to call for a con-
stitutional amendment abolishing all privacy, and a switch of national bird from the bald
eagle to the goldﬁsh, since their opinion was that everybody had been placed in a glass bowl.
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Figure 2.3.4: One of many cartoons appearing in the Chicago Tribune, a paper which ran
thousands of names. (Chicago Tribune, 9/2/1925)
2.4 The Eﬀect of Disclosure
The literature on the eﬀect of disclosure of income tax information is not very deep. A 2013
paper by Hasegawa, Hoopes, Ishida, and Slemrod noted that the academic literature has
extensively examined tax disclosure and privacy... However, this analysis... has proceeded in
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the complete absence of empirical evidence about what the eﬀects of income tax disclosure
might be... we know essentially nothing about the impact of tax disclosure rules on taxpayer
behavior (Hasegawa et al., 2013). The paper analyzes the distribution of taxpayers around a
disclosure threshold in Japan, before and after the phaseout of disclosure rules. The results
show that there is bunching immediately beneath the disclosure threshold, meaning that
individuals and corporations underreport their tax liabilities to avoid disclosure. A review
of ﬁnancial statements shows no evidence of a decline in corporate income over the same
period. Of course, this underreporting of income is the exact opposite outcome than what is
claimed earlier by La Follette and others. This result is, in the opinion of the authors, the
ﬁrst evidence regarding taxpayer response to a system of income tax disclosure (Hasegawa
et al., 2013).
I examine trends in the number of taxpayers by state level of disclosure. Using the
categories in section 3 of this chapter, I present statistics on the number individuals ﬁling a
taxable return, as well as the number of individuals ﬁling at levels of income above $15,000,
$20,000, $100,000, and $1 million. High disclosure states also happen to be high income
states; the levels of disclosure in states cannot be considered random.
We should look for eﬀects of disclosure in 1925, and possibly in 1926, but not in any other
year. Figure 2.4.1 shows that high disclosure states are also states that pay a lot in taxes.
Figure 2.4.2 shows that the eﬀect of disclosure on the total number of taxable returns is
small, as the red and blue lines both drop about as much, and the diﬀerence in their changes
since 1924 appear small and persistent through the 1920s.
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Figure 2.4.1: Number of taxable returns in states with high and low disclosure
































Figure 2.4.3 shows the trends in the number of taxpayers at incomes above $15,000,
$20,000, $100,000, and $1 million. The only graph that shows any large diﬀerence in trends
is the graph of million-dollar incomes. However, the number of million-dollar incomes in
nondisclosure states is only seven in 1924, so percent changes from this small level will
always be large. If this eﬀect were not attributable to small base size, then it appears that
disclosure is pushing the number of million-dollar incomes claimed down. This would conﬁrm
the ﬁndings of Hasegawa et al. A small eﬀect can be seen in the graph of $100,000 incomes,
where the blue line and red line seem to move together until 1925, when the blue line runs
below the red line. This again would be evidence that high disclosure states have slightly
fewer ﬁlers than can be expected. However, I can think of no reason that the trend would
persist, in either the $100,000 or $1 million case, through 1929. I am therefore skeptical that
there is any eﬀect of disclosure on income tax payments.
Additional graphs examining other measures of disclosure, and ﬁnding similar results,
can be found in the appendix.
2.4.1 Evidence of Income Shading
The Kansas City Star of September 2, 1925 mentioned a Treasury statement from the
previous day. According to the Star, the Treasury
pointed out that the amounts shown on the tax lists are the amounts of tax
declared to be due by taxpayers... and may be subject to adjustments and
revisions. In an eﬀort to escape widespread publicity, many corporations and
large individual taxpayers are submitting minimum returns until after the time
limit for publicity has expired, when they will amend their claims with additional
taxes.
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While I have not been able to ﬁnd this Treasury statement in print, it is unclear if the
Treasury knew precisely how many taxpayers were doing this at the time. Given that the
time period for publicity had started only the previous day, nobody would have ﬁled their
amended return yet if this was the plan. The previous year also may not provide much
guidance, as newspaper publicity was a surprise for many in late October of 1924, and
certainly publicity was not even law at the time the ﬁrst tax payment was due. Thus, 1923's
taxpayers would most likely not have revised their payments downward to begin with, and
1924's may have, but the number who adjusted upward would not have been known yet.
2.5 Conclusion
The Revenue Act of 1924 included a publicity provision that provides a unique window into
the income distribution of the period. The Revenue Act of 1924 occurred during a time of
Republican control, and steady declines in tax rates through the 1920s. Newspapers took
advantage of publicity by printing lists of names, addresses, and tax payments for individuals
and corporations in their city and sometimes beyond. In the ﬁrst year, this was a shock to
almost all parties, but the second year was more organized, and the tax lists are more reliable
in the second year as a result. The inclusion of publicity in the tax code does not seem to





A unique publicity provision in the Revenue Act of 1924 allowed newspapers to print tens of
thousands of names, addresses, and tax payments over a two year period. In this chapter,
I discuss the assembly of a dataset from newspaper microﬁlm images. I assess the accuracy
of the tax information that appears in newspapers. I outline the matching procedure for
individuals and their 1923 tax payments with their corresponding entry in the next year. I
also contribute computer code and video tutorials on automated matching for use by other
scholars. I include documentation of 200 variables in the resulting dataset, which will be
released for public use after a two year embargo.
3.2 Data Source
Data come from newspaper records from the period October 24, 1924 to November 20,
1924, and September 1 through 20, 1925. New York comes from the New York Times, and
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Chicago data comes from the Chicago Tribune. Additional records from the Washington
Post have been tabulated, but not included in any analysis to date. Income tax payments
that appeared in 1924 newspapers were from incomes in calendar year 1923, and payments
in 1925 newspapers were from calendar year 1924 incomes.
New York, 1923 New York, 1924 Chicago, 1923 Chicago, 1924
total 27,540 44,692 6,089 13,279
individual 18,150 29,921 4,954 12,077
w/address 16,001 28,651 29 12,681
corporation 12,798 811 469
estate 824 190
duplicate 5,939 149 98
other cities 1,310 3,290 282 666
w/address 538 1,504 0 0
Table 3.2.1: Summary statistics, number of records by year and city
By law, the Collectors of Internal Revenue were required to make the name, address,
and income tax payment of anybody ﬁling a return in their district available to inspection.
The New York Times and Chicago Tribune usually printed the name and address of each
taxpayer with their payment. In New York, the address sometimes did not appear. In
Chicago, the address appeared in 1925 but not in 1924. The names were sometimes full ﬁrst
and last names with a middle initial, but sometimes just ﬁrst initials and a last name.
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Figure 3.2.1: New York Times 1924 tax payments excerpt from September 3, 1925. Most
payments are above $500, with addresses. Some entries give full names while some only have
initials.
The Revenue Act of 1924 included a one time 25 percent rebate on 1923's taxes, after
they had been paid. The Chicago Tribune claimed multiple times that they ran the numbers
post-deduction, while the New York Times claimed multiple times that they ran them pre-
deduction. When the Chicago Tribune ran New York numbers, they said that the New York
oﬃce's numbers are not adjusted for the 25 percent deduction.
The New York Times included all payments over $500 in local tax collection districts,
though there are selected payments under $500 of notable people. The Chicago Tribune
runs every payment that they found. Lists sometimes were accompanied by articles that
described the high taxpayers found in lists at the Collector's oﬃce the previous day, often
with their industry or family details.
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Using data from the New York Times, I have constructed a dataset of just over 10,000
individuals whose entries can be considered matches between the two years. After removing
duplicates, estates, corporations, and people outside the New York area, there are 18,150
records in 1923 and 29,921 records in 1924. Of these, 11,774 match. The address ﬁeld is
given in 16,001 of 18,150 records in 1923, and in 28,651 of 29,921 records from 1924. I do
not perform any data analysis with the 824 estates or 12,798 corporations. In other cities,
there are 713 matches out of 1310 (1923) and 3290 (1924) entries. Address is given for 538
(1923) and 1504 (1924) of them.
Since the dataset is new and since newspaper editors may have been swayed to exclude
certain records from their lists, I will compare the dataset against aggregate statistics pre-
sented in the Statistics of Income. I will also present information that determines how
well-preserved the rank of each taxpayer is. This will be important in determining how
important the assumption of rank preservation is in studies with aggregate data.
Some perspective on the size of the sample can be gained by comparing the number of
returns with more than $20,000 of income in the sample against the number in New York
or the whole United States. In 1923, the sample has 7,486 individuals with over $20,000
in income. New York had 20,647, and the USA had 80,783. In 1924, the sample has 7,987
individuals with over $20,000 in income. New York had 25,969, and the USA had 96,434.
The sample therefore contains a number roughly equivalent to 1/3 of the number of ﬁlers in
New York in each year and 1/12 of the number of ﬁlers in the country.
The next piece of information that describes whether the sample is representative is the
number of ﬁlers in each income group relative to the total number of ﬁlers in each income
group. Appendix ﬁgures in section C.2 show probability densities for both years with a
minimum cutoﬀ of $20,000. In general, the sample underestimates up to about $40,000 and
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overestimates at higher incomes, but the sample is roughly consistent with the aggregate
data.
3.3 Assessing Data Accuracy
C. Wright Mills criticized the accuracy of the newspaper tax payment lists:
The release of this data was so administratively sloppy that one paper published
data about a man whom another paper ignored, some errors were printed, and
in some cases all journalists missed the names of people who were known to have
paid large taxes (There were, of course, some wealthy people whose entire income
was tax free) (Mills 1963, 376).
To investigate these claims, I checked a selection of entries from the New York Herald Tribune
(NYHT ). I checked the ﬁrst individual (non-corporate) payment over $500 under each letter
appearing in the Second District in October 1924 and the Third District in September 1925.
I also gathered all six-ﬁgure tax payments from the ﬁrst page of September 1925's high tax
payment list. I present the comparisons of the New York Times (Times) and New York
Herald Tribune numbers in tables.
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Name, in NYHT Times payment NYHT payment diﬀerence
A. C. Veatch 3735 3755
Barron, Jane M. 2422 not in Times
C. S. Goldsborough 1267 1267
Carl L. Otto 1314 1314
Catherine Townsend 2640 2640
Charles H. Amerling 5895 5895
Ernest E. Quantrell 6124 6124
Ethel Zabriskie 4664 4664
Frank A. Harden 1525 1525
Frederick A. Welman 7439 7439
Friedman, Henry A. 1751 1751
Herbert Stern 1110 1110
Hope Dillon 1964 1964
Isidor Calef 1028 1028
Joseph Yurkowitz 1161 1161
Martin E. Untermeyer 3323 3323
Moritz Neuberger 1722 1722
Nathan J. Levine 1529 1529
Philip L. Morrison 1404 1404
Ralph Pulitzer jr 4035 4035
Raymond Burnham 1449 1449
Robert C. Rathbone 2748 2748
William Adams Kissan 1085 1085
William Ewald 7441 7441
William F. Irwin 1053 7053 1/7 mixup
Table 3.3.1: New York Herald Tribune and New York Times 1923 tax lists comparison
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Name, in NYHT Times payment NYHT payment diﬀerence
Airey, Richard 77318 77318
Bacon, George W. 18212 18212
Church, George W. 47333 47338 3/8 mixup
Dixon, William J. 1809 1809
Eaton, Charles A. 1075 1075
Flagg, W. Allston 1940 1940
Gardner, Jennie Bell 2529 2529
Hoagland, Raymond 12468 12468
Ingle, John jr 1579 1579
Jones, Rodney Wilcox 2696 2696
Klauder, Murray 1342 1342
Levine, Arthur J. 2946 2946
Marston, Hunter S. 7187 7187
Nicoll jr., De Lancey 950 950
O'Keefe, Timothy 4286 4286
Potter, Edwin A. jr. 7385 7305
Quicke, Rose G. L. 13032 13032
Robinson, Ruth E. 2476 2475 last digit
Schubert, William H. 5490 5494 last digit
Tailer, Catherine Harding 1131 1131
Utard, Emile 12635 12635
Van Huekelom, Katharine W. 771 771
Watson, Charles H. 1813 1813
Zabriske, George A. 21486 21486
Zborowski, Louis 6185 6185
Zimmer, Edward 4400 4410 next to last digit
Table 3.3.2: New York Herald Tribune and New York Times 1924 tax lists comparison
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Table 3.3.3: New York Herald Tribune and New York
Times 1924 high tax lists comparison
Name, in Times Times payment NYHT payment diﬀerence
Rockefeller, J. D., Junior 6277669 6277669
Ford, Henry 2608808 2608806 6/8 mixup
Ford, Edsel 2158055 2158055
Mellon, Andrew W. 1882600 1882609.25 0/9 mixup
Whitney, Payne 1676626 1676559 last 3 digits
Mellon, R. B. 1180099 1180699.64 0/6 mixup
Dodge, Mrs. Anna Thompson 993028 993028
Vanderbilt, F. W. 772986 792986 7/9 mixup
Ryan, Thos. F. 791851 791851
Baker, George F., Junior 783408 783406 6/8 mixup
Astor, Vincent 642600 642600
Duke, J. B. 641250 641250
Morgan, J. P. 574379 574379
Foster, H. 569895 569989.7 5/9 mixup, 8/9
transpose
Johnson, Eldridge 542627 not in Times
Timken, H. H. 540336 540336.49
Lamont, Thomas W. 480747 480747
Warburg, F. M. 471404 471404
Schiﬀ, Mortimer L. 459410 459410
Kahn, Otto H. 391776 391776
Cochran, Alex. Smith 271542 371542.54 ﬁrst digit wrong
Gary, Elbert H. 322680 322680
Mackay, Clarence H. 320449 320449
Wood, William M. 229971 299971.29
Friedsam, M. 292396 292396
Mitchell, S. Z. 283903 283903
Baruch, B. M. 268142 268142.89
Bedford, E. T. 235390 235390
Ward, William B. 208586 208586
Wiggin, Albert H. 204013 204013
Burden, Florence V. 203654 not in Times
Steuer, Max D. 198455 198455
Kresge, S. S. 188068 188608 0/6 transpose
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Fairbanks, Douglas 182190 182190
Dupont, T. C. 181164 181164.49
Ehret, G., Senior 158445 158445.14
Harkness, Edith H. 155411 155411
Harkness, W. H. 134126 134126
Depew, Chauncey M. 125920 125920.4
Cravath, Paul D. 124570 124570
Vanderbilt, H. A. 94107 114951.25 NYHT is sum
of payments14
Diﬀerences in the numbers are usually minor, appearing towards the end of the string.
Some ﬁrst digits are wrong, but that is a rare mistake. Of the 24 entries checked for 1923, all
but two align perfectly; one is missing and one has a ﬁrst digit discrepancy. The correlation
coeﬃcient between the payment listed in the New York Herald Tribune and the New York
Times is 0.8387, but increases to 1.0000 when dropping the observation with a ﬁrst digit
discrepancy. Of the 68 entries checked for 1924, one is missing in the New York Times, and
the correlation coeﬃcient for the rest is 0.9999.
Only three people of 94 searched cannot be found in the New York Times list. The
opposite question, which is, is the list of top payments in the New York Times also contained
within the New York Herald Tribune, cannot be answered as easily. While plenty of six-ﬁgure
tax payments found in the New York Times do not appear in the New York Herald Tribune
high payment box on September 2, 1925, they certainly may appear on the following days.
I cannot answer this question easily without typing the full set of New York Herald Tribune
tax lists, which would be a truly voluminous task.
The three observations missing from the New York Times is actually a maximum number
of possible missing entries. During the data assembly process, some entries were illegible in
14the New York Herald Tribune runs the sum of the payments on a trust fund and regular income that
appear in the New York Times
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microﬁlm and do not appear in my New York Times dataset.
3.4 Matching
Once newspaper images were typed, the next task was to match the name, address, and 1923
tax payment information to the corresponding name, address, and tax payment information
for 1924. Entries for names, addresses, and payments could not be merged on exact string
matches in all cases. While exact string matching does return a large number of matches
(surprisingly, around 10 percent of the entries in Chicago and New York each), many more
can be obtained with fuzzy merging. I use the algorithm RECLINK by Michael Blasnik,
available on RePEc (Blasnik 2010), which computes the distance between any two strings by
counting the number of changes necessary to transform string one into string two. For each
string in 1923, RECLINK ﬁnds the closest ﬁtting string in 1924 and matches it, provided
that the closest string in 1924 is above some minimum threshold of closeness.15 RECLINK
also ﬁrst ﬁnds any exact matches between datasets, and also ignores any entries in a speciﬁed
exclude ﬁle. I also standardized names and addresses to the extent that it was clear to do
so; names were inverted to appear as Last, First, Jas. in the name ﬁeld became James,
and B'way became Broadway in the address ﬁeld, among many other changes.16
Entries in New York often contained addresses in both years, while in Chicago, address
is nearly never provided in 1923. In New York, I began by only considering entries where
an address was provided in each year. Therefore, the match process for New York ﬁrst
found matches with the exact name and exact address string in each year. Then, I allowed
address to fuzzy match, but name was still required to exactly match. In the second
15Though the default threshold is 0.6 on a 0-1 scale, most matches below 0.9 were incorrect.
16A tutorial and link to the do-ﬁle are on my YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/dsmarcin.
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round, this allowed something like MacMillan, Howard J., 137 W 86th to match to
MacMillan, Howard J., 173 W 86th, or 137 86th St, or other small variants of 137
W 86th. These matches were reviewed individually by hand for accuracy. In each stage,
there were both numerous false matches and numerous matches. The third round required
the address to match exactly, but allowed the name to vary slightly. Matches were again
reviewed, and ﬁnally, the last round allowed for a fuzzy match on both name and address.
I again reviewed the matches individually, before I relaxed the requirement that address
appear, and I repeated the same order of four fuzzy merges again. Removing the requirement
that an address be present meant that in exact address matching, both address strings were
empty. With fuzzy address matching, one address string would be empty and one would
be present; anything with an address string in both years would have been a previously
considered, and rejected, match candidate. After each round, conﬁrmed matches were added
to the exclude ﬁle, and therefore removed from consideration in subsequent rounds.
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Figure 3.4.1: Flowchart showing matching procedure
I preferred this procedure because it removes all exact name matches before considering
any fuzzy matches. Additionally, it removes those exact name matches with an exact address
match before attempting a fuzzy address match. In this way, I avoided several incorrect fuzzy
matches when an exact match was present.
After these eight rounds of fuzzy matching, I then sorted the complete database of all
entries, matched and unmatched, descending by payment in each year. In this way, it was
extremely easy to ﬁnd numerous false non-matches among the higher payment entries. Often,
this resulted from two people with the same last name matching incorrectly against a family
member. For example, McCormick, Ethan F. and McCormick, Edith N. might match
incorrectly to McCormick, E.N. and McCormick, Eth. F. due to the way RECLINK
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computes closeness and only reports the one closest match. This is also more diﬃcult with
common last names like Smith. Though each match and non-match was reviewed by hand,
errors may persist, and they may persist at lower payment levels for innocuous reasons
(example, if there is only Smith, J. in 1923, but Smith, J.F., Smith, E.J., Smith, J.D.,
Smith, J.S., and Smith, J.T. in 1924, I cannot match to any Smith in 1924 with much
certainty).
In some cases, matches were reviewed with the tax payments in mind. For example,
Gilbert, J.O. with a payment in the tens of thousands in 1923 and Gilbert, James O.
with payment of $532 in 1924 might not be matched, while the same names with payments in
the tens or hundreds of thousands in each year would be matched. In this way, the matching
criterion may bias the results; however, since one regression throws out large outliers where
the computed taxable incomes vary by a factor of 10, those matches would have been dropped
in that computation anyway.
The following heat map shows the persistence of high incomes among returns in the
sample. Returns are separated into deciles, and the color and number of each box indicate
how many in each decile in 1923 are matched to each decile, or are unmatched, in 1924. The
graph shows strong support for the idea of rank preservation. Certainly, in each decile, any
individual who can be found in the other year is most likely to be in the same or adjacent
decile. Additionally, the higher one is in the tax payment distribution, the more likely they
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Figure 3.4.2: Taxpayers matched by decile in each year. Low deciles (1, 2, ...) are low tax
payments.
In Chapter IV, I link again to other lists, including Forbes' rich lists, lists of large estates,
and other lists of tax payments. I repeat the RECLINK procedure to fuzzy match the
combined 1923-1924 tax payment dataset to other lists.
3.4.1 Matching Procedure Tutorials
As a byproduct of this matching process, I created video tutorials (screencasts) to share
this knowledge with the economic history and general economics communities. There is a
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playlist of tutorials on:
• Excel string manipulation17
• STATA string manipulation18
• The RECLINK procedure19
All videos can be found on my YouTube page.20 The code for name substitutions, address
substitutions, and name inversion can be found on my website.21
Name Inversion
My name inversion code can take a variable that is mixed First Last and Last, First and
standardize all entries as Last, First. This code was written to accommodate the majority
of New York Times tax payment entries, and may not generalize well to other lists that
have substantial diﬀerences. The code will succeed when a name entry appears as Last,
First Mi., extraneous information, but will sometimes fail if a name appears as First Mi.
Last, extraneous information.22 The code accommodates a number of words that tend to
appear after commas (estate, deceased, and wife, care, junior, senior, among others) and will
process those correctly.23 The code can easily be modiﬁed to correctly process commonly
appearing words in extraneous information that appears after commas. For instance, if a






22The successes come from the times that words that appear commonly after the comma are explicitly
handled by the code, and the failures are the remainder.
23example: James Harris, factory foreman will not invert to Harris, James, but Harris, James, factory
foreman will, as will James Harris, estate and James Harris, and wife.
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same way as estate, and wife, and others in the code to avoid this common problem.
For extraneous information that only happens a small percentage of the time, it is probably
best to correct by hand. A useful way to catch these errors is to sort the name ﬁeld, or the
resulting last name and ﬁrst name, by descending string length. Then names that are most
likely to be errors appear at the top.
3.5 Data Documentation
The assembled dataset has 40,411 observations and 200 variables. I list the variables here,
with a brief description of each.
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Table 3.5.1: Variables in dataset with descriptions
variable description
name taxpayer's name in 1923 tax list, or name in external
dataset if no 1923 record
uname taxpayer's name in 1924 tax list
address taxpayer's address in 1923 tax list
uaddress taxpayer's address in 1924 tax list
payment1923 tax payment in 1923 list
nyhtname23 name of taxpayer in New York Herald Tribune, 1923
nyht23 tax payment in 1923 NYHT
payment1924 1924 tax payment
nyhtname24 1924 name in NYHT
nyht24 1924 payment in NYHT
district1923 tax Collector district within New York, 1923
city1923 city if outside New York, 1923
district24 tax Collector district within New York, 1924
city1924 city if outside New York, 1924
corp1923 C if corporation in 1923
source1923 date and page of New York Times record, 1923
anychangemade23 indicates any change from data typing service records: n
name, a address, p payment, 1923
notes23 indicates duplicate or conﬂicting observations, 1923
idmaster uniquely identiﬁes 1923 tax records
oldpay23 string variable of payment in newspaper, includes
illegibles or nontaxables, 1923
myscore match score from RECLINK, from merge of 1923 and
1924 lists
idusing uniquely identiﬁes 1924 tax records
corp1924 C if corporation in 1924
source24 date and page of New York Times record, 1924
anychangemade24 indicates any change from data typing service records: n
name, a address, p payment, 1924
notes24 indicates duplicate or conﬂicting observations, 1924
oldpay24 string variable of payment in newspaper, includes
illegibles or nontaxables, 1924
censusnotes any biographical information discovered on person in
1924's top 400 to help with matching
address1920 1920 Census address
sons1920 1920 Census number of sons
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daughters1920 1920 Census number of daughters
servants1920 1920 Census number of servants
headhouse1920 1920 Census, household status (head, wife, son, etc)
homeown1920 1920 Census homeownership, O own, R rent, Un
unknown
mortgage1920 1920 Census mortgage information, O own, F free
sex1920 1920 Census sex, M male F female
color1920 1920 Census color, all W for white
age1920 1920 Census age, as string, includes missing. See
realage1920 for numeric.
marital1920 1920 Census marital status. D divorced, S single, M
married, W widowed, Un unknown
immigyear1920 1920 Census year of immigration
natoralien1920 1920 Census alien or naturalized
naturyear1920 1920 Census year of naturalization. Sometimes is before
the immigration year and can't be trusted. Also often
conﬂicts with the years given in 1930 by the same
people.
inschool1920 1920 Census, whether in school.
canread1920 1920 Census, whether can read.
canwrite1920 1920 Census, whether can write.
birthplace1920 1920 Census birthplace of person
mothtong1920 1920 Census mother tongue
patbirth1920 1920 Census paternal birthplace
pattongue1920 1920 Census paternal language
matbirth1920 1920 Census maternal birthplace
mattongue1920 1920 Census maternal language
engspeak1920 1920 Census whether English speaker
profession1920 1920 Census self reported profession
industry1920 1920 Census self reported industry
salarytype1920 1920 Census salary type, OA for own account, Em
employed, W wage worker, S salaried worker
sector1920 1920 Census, sector, my description given profession &
industry
occup1920 1920 Census occupation, my match to Census broad
categories
address1930 1930 Census address
sons1930 1930 Census number of sons
daughters1930 1930 Census number of daughters
servants1930 1930 Census number of servants
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homeown1930 1930 Census homeownership, O own, R rent, Un
unknown
rentorvalue1930 1930 Census home value or monthly rent
radio1930 1930 Census, R for household owns radio
liveonfarm1930 1930 Census, yes for families on farms
sex1930 1930 Census sex
color1930 1930 Census color
age1930 1930 Census age, as string. See realage1930 for numeric
values.
marital1930 1930 Census marital status
ageatﬁrstmarriage1930 1930 Census age at ﬁrst marriage
inschool1930 1930 Census, whether in school
canreadwrite1930 1930 Census, whether can read/write
birthplace1930 1930 Census birthplace of person
patbirth1930 1930 Census father's birthplace
matbirth1930 1930 Census mother's birthplace
langspokenbeforeusa1930 1930 Census language spoken at home
yearimmig1930 1930 Census year of immigration
naturalized1930 1930 Census whether naturalized
canspeakenglish1930 1930 Census whether an English speaker
occupation1930 1930 Census occupation, self reported
industry1930 1930 Census industry, self reported
sector1930 1930 Census sector, my description given occupation &
industry
occup1930 1930 Census occupation, my match to Census broad
categories
employed1930 1930 Census, whether employed on last working day
veteran1930 1930 Census, whether a veteran
war1930 1930 Census, war served in. WW world war, Sp Spanish
American, Husband WW for husband indicates WW
veteran status
kleinlastname Last name in Klein's list of large estates
idcensus uniquely identiﬁes those who appear in either 1923 or
1924 New York Times tax lists
kleinscore match score from merge operation between Klein list
and NYT list
idklein uniquely identiﬁes observations in Klein
estatesize size of estate from Klein
parenssection separates any information in parentheses in Klein list
commasection separates any information after comma in Klein list
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withoutcomma the name, without extraneous information, in the Klein
list
kleinmerge klein merge code, 1 for master only (NYT tax lists), 3
for match
forbesmmaﬁrstname ﬁrst name from Forbes's Men Making America
forbesmmascore Forbes Men Making America merge closeness score
forbesmmalastname last name from Forbes's Men Making America
idforbesmma uniquely identiﬁes Forbes MMA entries
where_born Forbes MMA birthplace
parentsstatus Forbes MMA wealth of parents
age1921 Forbes MMA age in 1921
began Forbes MMA ﬁrst job
chiefsuccess Forbes MMA industry of person's success
forbesmmamerge Forbes MMA merge code, 1 for master only, 3 for match
forbesrichlastname Forbes rich list last name
forbesrichﬁrstname Forbes rich list ﬁrst name
forbesrichscore Forbes rich list merge closeness score
idforbesrichlist Forbes rich list unique identiﬁer
forbesrichname Forbes rich list name
estimatedfortune Forbes rich list estimated fortune
yearlyincome Forbes rich list yearly income
chiefsource Forbes rich list chief source of income/wealth
forbesrichmerge Forbes rich list merge code
rumlonelastname Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list last name
rumlonescore Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list closeness score
rumloneﬁrstname Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list ﬁrst name
idrumlone Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list unique identiﬁer
salary1941 Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list salary for 1941
totalincome1941 Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list total income for
1941
tax1941 Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list total tax for 1941
ni1941aftertax Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list net income after
tax for 1941
rumlonemerge Morgenthau memo top 10 salary list merge code
rumltwolastname Morgenthau memo top 100 income list last name
rumltwoﬁrstname Morgenthau memo top 100 income list ﬁrst name
rumltwoscore Morgenthau memo top 100 income list closeness score
idrumltwo Morgenthau memo top 100 income list unique identiﬁer
ni1936 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1936, within 1941's top 10
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ni1937 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1937, within 1941's top 10
ni1938 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1938, within 1941's top 10
ni1939 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1939, within 1941's top 10
ni1940 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1940, within 1941's top 10
ni1941 Morgenthau memo top 100 income list net income for
1941, within 1941's top 10
rumlcancel Morgenthau memo top 100 income list, tax liability
cancelled under Ruml plan
remainingtax Morgenthau memo top 100 income list, tax liability
remaining under Ruml plan
rumltwomerge Morgenthau memo top 100 income list merge code
manipname name for manipulation & isolation of ﬁrst/last name,
usually generated from the longer of name and uname
lastname last name isolated from manipname (see nameclean.do,
or YouTube tutorial)
ﬁrstname ﬁrst name isolated from manipname
klauslastname Wealth by Reputation memo last name
klausﬁrstname Wealth by Reputation memo ﬁrst name
klausmiddle Wealth by Reputation memo middle initial or name
klausscore Wealth by Reputation memo closeness score
idklaus Wealth by Reputation memo unique identiﬁer
klausdistrict Wealth by Reputation memo taxpayer district
klausstate Wealth by Reputation memo taxpayer state
klausother_ex_trust Wealth by Reputation memo taxpayer Jr., D for
deceased or Trust
klausspouse Wealth by Reputation memo spouse name
klausnetinc1928 Wealth by Reputation memo 1928 net income
klaustax1928 Wealth by Reputation memo 1928 tax
eﬀtaxrate1928 Wealth by Reputation memo tax over net income 1928
totaltax1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated total
tax, 1928
cgtax1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated capital
gains tax, 1928
nrmtax1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated normal
tax, 1928
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srtax1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated surtax,
1928
cg1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated capital
gains total, 1928
ni_noCG_1928 Wealth by Reputation memo Python generated total net
income without capital gains, 1928
klausni1929 Wealth by Reputation memo 1929 net income
klaust1929 Wealth by Reputation memo 1929 tax
klausni1930 Wealth by Reputation memo 1930 net income
klaust1930 Wealth by Reputation memo 1930 tax
klausni1931 Wealth by Reputation memo 1931 net income
klaust1931 Wealth by Reputation memo 1931 tax
klausni1932 Wealth by Reputation memo 1932 net income
klaust1932 Wealth by Reputation memo 1932 tax
klausni1933 Wealth by Reputation memo 1933 net income
klaust1933 Wealth by Reputation memo 1933 tax
klausni1934 Wealth by Reputation memo 1934 net income
klaust1934 Wealth by Reputation memo 1934 tax
klausrank Wealth by Reputation memo list order, sometimes is
missing for names with multiple entries
klausmerge Wealth by Reputation memo merge code
_mergeklein identiﬁes those unmatched in Klein estate list
_mergeforbesrich identiﬁes those unmatched in Forbes rich list
_mergeforbesmma identiﬁes those unmatched in Forbes Men Making
America list
_mergerumlone identiﬁes those unmatched in Morgenthau Top 10 salary
list
_mergerumltwo identiﬁes those unmatched in Morgenthau Top 100
income list
_mergeklaus identiﬁes those unmatched in Wealth by Reputation list
homeval numeric value of home value or rent, 1930 census
marriedage numeric value of 1930 census age at ﬁrst marriage
realage1920 numeric value of 1920 census age
realage1930 numeric value of 1930 census age
realimmigyear1920 numeric value of 1920 census immigration year
realimmigyear1930 numeric value of 1930 census immigration year
deciles1923 decile of 1923 tax payment, 1 low, 10 high
deciles1924 decile of 1924 tax payment, 1 low, 10 high
censuspct decile within 1924's top 400 (1-40: 10, 361-400:1)
censusfound1920 whether found in census in 1920
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censusfoundwdiedby1930 whether found in census in 1930, also an indication if
person is conﬁrmed dead before 1930
inny23 whether in New York in 1923 tax list
inny24 whether in New York in 1924 tax list
diedby1930 whether dead by 1930 (missing only means not
conﬁrmed)
censusfound1930 whether found in census in 1930, regardless of whether
conﬁrmed dead before 1930
rank1924 descending rank of taxpayer in 1924
rank1923 descending rank of taxpayer in 1923
pcttaxpaid1923 percent of total US tax paid in 1923
cmltax1923 cumulative percent through this person of US tax paid
in 1923
pcttaxpaid1924 percent of total US tax paid in 1924
cmltax1924 cumulative percent through this person of US tax paid
in 1924
klausni1928rank rank of individual in Wealth by Reputation, 1928 net
income
klaustax1928rank rank of individual in Wealth by Reputation, 1928 tax
3.5.1 Data Availability
All data and documentation will be made available after a two year embargo. I will consider
co-authorship requests during the embargo.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter describes the assembly of a new dataset based primarily on names, addresses,
and high tax payments that appeared in the New York Times in 1923 and 1924. The
data is well documented; all observations can be traced back to their original newspaper
sheet. I compare the data against aggregate statistics and other newspapers and ﬁnd that it
withstands a reasonable amount of scrutiny. I describe the automated matching procedure
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and provide guidance to other researchers attempting similar work. The data form a valuable
contribution to the study of high incomes in American history.
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CHAPTER IV
Who are the top 400?
4.1 Introduction
The Revenue Act of 1924 provided for publicity and open inspection of income tax returns in
the United States. While only in eﬀect for two years, this provision gives us a unique window
into the identities of high-income individuals. Major newspapers ran name, address, and tax
payment for tens of thousands of high-income individuals. I link this data to the 1920 and
1930 Census, as well as ﬁve lists of high-income and high-wealth Americans. In doing so, I
oﬀer descriptive statistics of the high-income group that are rarely, if ever, publicly available.
The second chapter describes the Revenue Act of 1924, how it came to be, the context
of its passage, and the tax system that it implemented. This chapter describes data on the
highest tax payments appearing in public lists, and the identities of those who paid them.
I attempt to determine how many of the fortunes were self-made or inherited by consulting
lists of families with large estates in the preceding decades.
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4.2 Literature
Data on high-income Americans may be hard to come by, but the literature is ﬁlled with
studies of unspeciﬁed methodologies on their identities and demographics.
BC Forbes, in Men Who are Making America, compiles a series of short biographies of
extremely successful men (Forbes 1926). While the sample is certainly not scientiﬁc, Forbes
praises all of the men as extremely industrious. He notes that they are nearly all over the
age of 50, and says this implies that vast fortunes must be earned through hard work over
decades. This argues against the work of Klein and Lundberg noted in the previous chapter.
Klein (1921) ﬁnds that those known to be wealthy or to be the heirs of large estates held large
controlling interests in domestic industries. Lundberg (1939) analyzes 1923-24 newspaper
tax lists for the presence of wealthy family surnames. Forbes argues for self-made fortunes
while Klein and Lundberg assert that wealth, power, and privilege are inherited.
C. Wright Mills (1963) compiles a list of wealthy Americans with $30 million fortunes.
He considers 275 individuals of his own choosing; he calls them the 90 richest of 1900, the
95 richest of 1925, and the 90 richest of 1950. Mills does not reveal who is on his list, but
he does give general information on them.24 Among his sources are Lundberg (1939) and
Myers (1936). Mills also raises issues with the quality of 1924-1925 tax payment lists; these
are addressed in the previous chapter.
Edward N. Wolﬀ uses Federal Reserve survey data to provide demographic data on the
rich in the US for 1983 and 1992 (Wolﬀ 2000). The Survey of Consumer Finances, admin-
istered to a representative sample, plus a high-income supplement, allows Wolﬀ to describe
both the high-income and high-wealth group. Wolﬀ provides information on age, education,
marital status, race, employment, industry, and occupation. He is able to do this for both
24For example, he gives the region of their birthplace, their median age, and their class background.
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1983 and 1992, and to view changes between those two surveys. He ﬁnds that the high-
income and high-wealth groups are much more highly educated than the general population,
and that 98 percent of the rich are non-Hispanic whites, despite only 75 percent of the popu-
lation ﬁtting that category at the time. Employment dropped sharply among the non-elderly
wealthy, from 86 to 77 percent over the time period studied, and retirement increased from
4 to 10 percent. Employees in ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, farming, mining, and business
services were overrepresented among the rich, while other occupations including manufac-
turing and transportation were underrepresented. Wolﬀ presents many fascinating statistics
on the rich that can be duplicated with Census data on the large taxpayers of the 1920s.
Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim use conﬁdential US Treasury data to determine
the occupations of the top 1 percent of the income distribution from 1979 to 2005 (Bakija
et al. 2012). The authors ﬁnd that in 2004, nearly 20 percent of the top 0.1 percent by
income have occupations in ﬁnance or are executives at ﬁnancial ﬁrms. About 6 percent are
lawyers and 3 percent are in entertainment. When analyzing data from the full period of
1979 to 2005, they ﬁnd that the share of occupations in ﬁnance grew dramatically, but other
occupations remained mostly stable.
The IRS makes data tables available on top wealth holders by size of net worth, age, and
state with data from the Personal Wealth Study, going as far back as 1989.25
4.3 Inequality and mobility
A growing literature examines income inequality and social mobility in the United States
over the 20th century. A recent study by Chetty et al. studies American intergenerational
mobility in the latter part of the 20th century (Chetty et al. 2014). Using de-identiﬁed tax
25http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Personal-Wealth-Statistics
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data, the authors compute the correlation between parent and child income percentile ranks.
They conclude that there is no diﬀerence in mobility, but that the stakes are higher in the
birth lottery since income inequality has increased. Clark et al. use the rarity of surnames
in lists of people of high status to compute social mobility across nations and centuries (Clark
et al. 2014). They ﬁnd a relatively constant correlation between parent and child high status
of about 0.75 to 0.85, regardless of country or time period.
A monograph from the US Temporary National Economic Committee gives a multitude
of ﬁgures on concentration of income from 1918 to 1937. From 1918 to 1924 and 1930 to
1937, the share of income earned by the top 1 percent ﬂuctuated between 12 and 14 percent.
However, from 1925 to 1929, this share ﬂuctuated between 16 and 19 percent (Concentration
1941, 16). The minimum net income to be in the top 1 percent was $7,045, and 429,280
people were in that class. To be a member of the top 1/100 of 1 percent, the minimum net
income was $118,400, and a total of 4,293 people ranked there (Concentration 1941, 28-29).
In Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, Emmanuel
Saez (2012) provides evidence that the shares of income accruing to the top percentiles of
US families in the present day are similar to the levels seen in the 1920s. The top decile,
both including and excluding capital gains, hovered between 40 and 50 percent both now
and in the 1920s, but stayed between 30 and 35 percent for almost the entire span from 1940
to 1980. Meanwhile, around 20 percent of total income accrued to the top 1 percent in the
1920s and today, while that ﬁgure was below 15 percent from the early 1940s to the late
1980s. The top 0.01 percent had an even more stark diﬀerence, with 3 to 6 percent of total
income accruing to them in the 1920s and today, but only around 1 percent between 1940
and 1980.
Lynn Karoly (1994) examined the link between changing inequality and tax policy that
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may accelerate changes in Trends in income inequality: the impact of, and implications for,
tax policy. Karoly used data from the US Census Current Population Survey from 1970 to
1990 to analyze changes in the Gini coeﬃcient of pre-tax income. Karoly found, however,
that tax policy did not contribute very much to changes in income inequality in the USA
from 1970 to 1990. In addition, she found that attempts to institute a more progressive tax
system could not be enough to oﬀset the gains in inequality.
Ferdinand Lundberg explored the golden dynasties who wield power and inﬂuence in
early 20th century America (Lundberg, 1939). Similarly, in Dynastic America and Those
Who Own It, Henry Klein (1921) noted the sizes of large estates in the years preceding 1921.
Klein concluded that the majority of wealth in America is inherited, not earned. If true,
these books argue against the applicability of the lessons of the 1920s to current tax policy
if today's fortunes are self-made (certainly true for Gates, Buﬀett, and numerous corporate
executives).
4.4 Data
I use the New York Times list of 1923 and 1924 taxpayers described in chapters two and
three. I link this to several new sources. First is the 1920 and 1930 US Federal Census of
the Population individual level observations. I manually searched for these records through
Ancestry.com. There are advantages to searching for high-income taxpayers. Due to their
enormous fame, these people often appear in encyclopedias with birth dates and locations.
Additionally, the 1920 and 1930 Census have occupation information, as well as the number
of servants living in the household. The 1930 Census also has the value of the home. Due
to these additional pieces of information, I can match around 70 percent of the top 400
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taxpayers to their Census records.
I also link to a list of large estates up to 1921. The list that I use claims to be a complete
list of estates over $10 million and a partial list of estates over $5 million (Klein 1921). I
match on last name only between the newspaper tax dataset and this list of large estates.
I link to BC Forbes's Men Who Are Making America (Forbes 1926) which contains a list
of 50 wealthy industrialists, giving information on age, parents' social status, and industry
sector of chief success. I also use the ﬁrst Forbes rich list (Forbes 1918), which also gives
industry sector, as well as an indication of who is both wealthy and famous.26
I link to Wealth by Reputation, a Treasury report prepared by Samuel Klaus, a Treasury
analyst, under the supervision of Robert Jackson (Klaus 1935). Jackson, the general counsel
at the Bureau of Internal Revenue, sought to know how much income was controlled by
powerful corporate executives, so he had Klaus prepare a report of about 200 taxpayers with
net income and tax from 1928 to 1934.27 These taxpayers represent some combination of who
is thought to be powerful and who has high income. It is not explained how these speciﬁc
200 came to be included, but certainly they are among the elite. They almost certainly are
not the precise top taxpayers in any year from 1928-1934 or even the combination of those
years.
I also link to a memo prepared by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau in 1941 (Tax
Notes 1996). During a debate over the treatment of 1941's taxes when bringing withholding
into existence, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to know which taxpayers would most
beneﬁt from a partial or complete forgiveness of 1941's taxes. FDR explicitly asked for
a memo without names, but received a memo with the names and incomes of the top 10
26As I will show later, some names in the newspapers are surprising to editors and readers. It is possible
that some high-income people might be relatively anonymous. Based on my experience matching records to
the Census, I think that this is rare.
27Jackson was later the Attorney General, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
83
salaried employees in 1941. Morgenthau included another table with the top 100 net incomes
in 1941, with net incomes also given for 1940. For the top 10 on this list, he included net
incomes back to 1936.
The linking of these datasets to the newspaper tax lists provides a unique look at in-
comes and mobility across decades and generations. I start by looking to the past from the
perspective of 1924. I see whose last name matches the last name of a large estate in recent
times, which gives an idea of who is inheriting wealth from an earlier generation (but not
necessarily who is not). Looking forward from 1924, I start with tax paid in 1923 and 1924,
and add net income and tax paid from 1928 to 1934, as well as 1940 and 1941, with a few
observations of 1936 to 1939. John D. Rockefeller Jr. appears in every one of these years,
and Edsel Ford appears as well with income too low to be reported from 1932 to 1934. Many
others that were not in 1941's top ten were in the top 100, and so span the full length of the
period, including Doris Duke and Henry Ford.
The number of matches is listed in table 4.4.1. Match rates to the 1920 and 1930 Census
are low for the total dataset by design; I only looked for matches in the top 400, so the match
rates in the total dataset only reﬂect searches among the top 400 payments in 1924.28
28Matches outside of the top 400 represent a few insurance matches beyond 400.
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in top 100 in top 200 in top 400 total
number 100 200 400 40411
1920 census 73 152 291 293
(percent of group) (73) (76) (73) -
1930 census 69 133 266 270
(percent of group) (69) (67) (67) -
1920 and 1930 54 110 217 219
(percent of group) (54) (55) (54) -
Klein estates 26 44 87 3759
(percent of group) (26) (22) (22) (9)
Forbes MMA 8 12 16 31
(percent of 30) (16) (24) (32) (62)
Forbes Rich 9 12 15 20
(percent of 50) (30) (40) (50) (67)
1928-1934 Treasury 27 36 53 111
(percent of 208) (13) (17) (25) (53)
1940-41 Salaried 0 0 0 2
(percent of 10) (0) (0) (0) (20)
1940-41 Top 100 7 11 17 39
(percent of 100) (7) (11) (17) (39)
Table 4.4.1: Number of observations matched across data sources
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Top 100 incomes, by name, for 1941, with
incomes for 1940 also given. For 1941's top
10, the memo also gives incomes for
1936-1939, and more detailed information
on income.
Table 4.4.2: Data descriptions
4.4.1 Census matching success
Table 4.4.1 shows that the rate of matching to the Census in 1920 only, 1930 only, and both
years is roughly the same for the top 100, 200, and 400. I explore this more in this section. I
divide the top 400 into deciles of 40 each and examine the match rates in each decile. I also
compare match rates against whether the individual lived in the New York area according
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to the newspaper tax lists. Finally, I compare the ages of those that I ﬁnd in 1920 against
whether I can match them in 1930. In this last case, I also examine the ages of those that
died before 1930, according to encyclopedia entries.
It is hard to see any pattern in match rates by decile within the top 400 for either the
1920 or 1930 Census. There may be a slight increase in match rates for the 1920 Census
near the top, but it is slight. The match rate is higher for those living outside the New
York area in both 1920 and 1930, but again, not drastically. The match rates also appear
nearly identical for those that appear in both 1923 and 1924, and those that only appear in
1924. The age graph matches intuition perfectly. Those that died by 1930 are on average
the oldest in 1920, and those that cannot be found in 1930, but are not conﬁrmed to have
died before 1930, are next oldest (of course, they may have died, as I do not have a death
date on everybody, which I believe explains the increase). Those that can be found in both
1920 and 1930 are the youngest, on average, of the three groups.
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Figure 4.4.1: Matching totals by decile within the top 400, 1920 Census
Figure 4.4.2: Matching totals by decile within the top 400, 1930 Census
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Figure 4.4.3: Matching totals by New York residency, 1920 Census
Figure 4.4.4: Matching totals by New York residency, 1930 Census
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Figure 4.4.5: Matching totals for 1930 Census by decile of 1923 tax payment
Figure 4.4.6: Mean age in 1920 Census by whether found in 1930 Census, or known to have
died
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4.4.2 Correlation of tax payment and income
In the main year of interest, 1924, I have information on the tax payment, but not the income
of the individual. I attempt to show that the ordering of tax payments and the ordering
of incomes is very similar. I use 1928-1934 data on top taxpayers to compare the ranks of
the top incomes and the top taxpayers. In years most likely to be unaﬀected by the Great
Depression, 1928 and 1934, the Spearman's rank correlation coeﬃcient is very high. Years
between 1929 and 1933 are highly likely to be aﬀected by prior year losses, which would
aﬀect the relationship between stated income in a given year and the tax liability owed in
that year. I present the results in Table 4.4.3. The correlation coeﬃcient of the values of net









Table 4.4.3: Spearman's rank correlation coeﬃcient between taxes paid and net income,
1928-1934 top taxpayers
I also show the top 30 individual incomes of 1928, connected with their tax payments
in 1928, in Figure 4.4.7. The two left columns indicate the names of the top 30 taxpayers,
adjacent to their net incomes. The thin blue lines connect the ranked net incomes with the
ranked tax payments. Most lines are relatively ﬂat and none move more than a handful of
spots. The number one and number two incomes are the number one and two tax payments,
in order, and the top 5 incomes are the top 5 tax payments, though not in order.
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Figure 4.4.7: 1928 net incomes and taxes, linked
4.5 The Top Taxpayers
4.5.1 Distribution and Pareto coeﬃcient
In 1923, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. paid 0.84 percent of all federal individual income taxes,
while he paid 0.89 percent of all federal individual income taxes for 1924. The top 100 paid
just under 6 percent of taxes in 1923 and about 7.5 percent in 1924. The top 400 paid about
10 percent of federal individual income taxes in 1923, and 13.5 percent in 1924.
Figure 4.5.1 shows each individual's percent of total federal individual income taxes in
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each year, as well as the cumulative distribution through that person, in each year. I also ﬁt a
Pareto distribution to the tax payments of the top 400 in each year. In 1923, payments follow
a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient 1.504 and standard error 0.0752. In 1924, payments
follow a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient 1.591 and standard error 0.0795.
Figure 4.5.1: Percent of taxes paid by the top 400 in 1923 and 1924
Given that the term top 1 percent has become extremely popular, I compute the share
of taxpaying units held by the top 400. Piketty and Saez (2003) give the number of taxpaying
units in the US in 1923 and 1924 as 44,409,000 and 45,384,000, respectively. If each were
rounded to 40 million, then the top 400 in each year would be one one-hundred-thousandth
of the population, or one one-thousandth of a percent. This would be the 0.001 percent. The
precisely computed numbers in each year are 0.00090 percent for 1923 and 0.00088 percent
for 1924.
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4.5.2 The Top Ten
I present the top ten taxpayers in both 1923 and 1924 in order, with the industries that
they are most well known for, and amassed their fortunes in, as well as a small amount of
biographical information. Not surprisingly, most of the top ten remain famous to this day,
and seven appear on both top ten lists.
Rank,
1923
Name Tax Industry Short Biography
1 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. $7,435,169 Oil Head of Standard Oil, son of JD
Rockefeller, founder
2 Henry Ford $2,467,946 Auto Auto executive
3 Payne Whitney $2,041,951 Oil full name William Payne
Whitney, partial heir to Payne
and Whitney fortunes
4 Edsel Ford $1,984,254 Auto Son of Henry Ford
5 Edward Harkness $1,755,259 Oil Son of Stephen Harkness,
original partner in Standard Oil
6 Anna Harkness $1,422,676 Oil Wife of Stephen Harkness,
mother of Edward Harkness
7 Andrew Mellon $1,173,988 Banking,
aluminum
Secretary of Treasury, ﬁnanced
Alcoa
8 William Wrigley, Jr. $1,154,420 Gum Chewing gum manufacturer
9 T. W. Lamont $847,820 Banking JP Morgan partner, advisor to
Wilson, Hoover, FDR
10 Julius Fleischmann $827,384 Yeast Inherited Fleischmann's Yeast,
later Mayor of Cincinnati




Name Tax Industry Short Biography
1 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. $6,277,669 Oil Head of Standard Oil, son of JD
Rockefeller, founder
2 Henry Ford $2,608,808 Auto Auto executive
3 Edsel Ford $2,158,055 Auto Son of Henry Ford
4 Andrew Mellon $1,882,600 Banking,
aluminum
Secretary of Treasury
5 Payne Whitney $1,676,626 Oil full name William Payne
Whitney, partial heir to Payne
and Whitney fortunes
6 Edward Harkness $1,351,708 Oil son of Stephen Harkness, original
partner in Standard Oil
7 R. B. Mellon $1,180,099 banking brother of Andrew Mellon
8 Clinton H. Crane $1,066,716 naval ar-
chitecture,
mining
Naval architect and head of
family mining business
9 Anna Harkness $1,061,537 Oil Wife of Stephen Harkness,
mother of Edward Harkness
10 Anna Thompson Dodge $993,028 Auto widow of Horace Dodge, auto
executive
Table 4.5.2: Top ten taxpayers, 1924
4.5.3 The Top Hundred
The top one hundred taxpayers in each year are also presented in the appendix, with their
tax payments and their rank in the other year. I also present their share of total federal
income tax paid for the year, as well as the cumulative percent of all federal tax paid through
that person. While the rest of the top 100 may not be household names to this day, at the
time, they were certainly extremely well known as wealthy people.
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4.5.4 The Top 400
I provide summaries of Census data for the top 100, 200, and 400 taxpayers for 1924. The
1920 and 1930 Census contains information on age, gender, race, children, servants, immi-
gration status, marital status, homeownership, occupation, and industry. The 1930 Census
also provides information on veteran status, home value, and whether the household owns
a radio or lives on a farm. This information can be compared against averages found in
Manhattan, New York City, New York state, and the country in the 1920 and 1930 Census.
As noted previously, I can link 73 of the top 100, 152 of the top 200, and 291 of the top
400 to the 1920 Census. I can link 69 of the top 100, 133 of the top 200, and 266 of the top
400 to the 1930 Census. I can link 54 of the top 100, 110 of the top 200, and 217 of the top
400 to both. I can also establish from other biographical information that 43 of the top 400
died before 1930 and another three had left the country.
Age, sex, race
The mean and median ages in 1920 are around 50 years old for the top 100, 200, and 400.
Doris Duke is the youngest member at six years of age, while there are ﬁve over the age of
80. In 1930, the mean and median are again relatively steady around 58 years, for each of
the top 100, 200, and 400. Doris Duke is again the youngest, at 17, while three others, all
heirs (Timken, Vanderbilt, Harkness) are in their 20s. The next youngest in the top 100 is
Edsel Ford, who is 36. Ellen Browning Scripps is oldest at 93, and Henry C. Phipps and
George F. Baker, are also 90 or older.
In all divisions of the top 400, the vast majority (around 80 percent) are male. All persons
are white in each year. In the 1920 and 1930 Census, the male/female split is almost exactly
50/50 in both years at the New York City borough, city, New York state, and national level.
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White is also the overwhelming majority race on all four levels. The age distribution of the
top 400 skews much older than the Census population at all geographic levels.
in top 100 in top 200 in top 400
age, 1920 mean 49.9 49.4 50.3
median 49 49 50
st dev 13.7 13.0 13.0
min 6 6 6
max 80 85 85
age, 1930 mean 57.7 57.0 58.4
median 58 57.5 58
st dev 12.6 12.4 12.5
min 17 17 17
max 90 90 93
sex, 1920 female 20.5 17.8 18.2
(percent) male 79.5 82.2 81.8
sex, 1930 female 20.3 15.8 17.0
(percent) male 79.7 84.2 83.0
color, 1920 white 100 100 100
color, 1930 white 100 100 100
Table 4.5.3: Demographic statistics, 1920 and 1930
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Figure 4.5.2: Age distribution, 1920
Figure 4.5.3: 1930 ages, all
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Figure 4.5.4: 1930 ages, males
Figure 4.5.5: 1930 ages, females
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Marital status, children, servants, homeownership
Most of the top taxpayers are married. The next most prevalent status is single, then wid-
owed, then divorced. Each of these appear in very few records compared to those indicating
marriage. They overwhelmingly claim status as the head of household, with a moderate
number reporting as the wife of the head of household. Very few are daughters or sons of the
head of household, and one is an insane patient (Stanley McCormick). The top taxpayers
also predominantly own homes, rather than renting. They usually own their homes free of
any mortgage.
The age at ﬁrst marriage is also reported in 1930. The median is 27 years for the top
100, 200, and 400, and the mean age hovers around 28 in each set.
The mean home value in the top 100 is over $400,000, while just above $350,000 and
$275,000 for the top 200 and 400, respectively. The median home value is $250,000, $200,000,
and $150,000 for the top 100, 200, and 400 respectively. Fifteen of the top 400 live in homes
valued at $1 million or more, with Richard B. Mellon leading the way in a $3 million house
on Fifth Avenue in Pittsburgh. The median home value at this time in Manhattan is $20,000,
while it is $4,778 for the US as a whole. The wealthy who rent predominantly pay more
than $100 monthly, when Manhattan median rent is $43.64, and US median rent is $27.15.
The average number of children is less than one son and less than one daughter per entry
(about 0.8 for each in 1920, and about 0.6 for each in 1930). However, this certainly does
not imply that the wealthy have only that many children. To be recorded, the children had
to be in the household at that time. As the individuals observed are usually older, they may
have much older children who do not live in the household any longer.
The wealthy did not hold back in hiring servants. The top 400 had over ﬁve servants on
average in both years, and Eleanor W. Dixon had 44 servants in 1930. The most servants in
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1920 worked for Otto H. Kahn, who employed a total of 22.
Compared against Census averages, the top 400 are more often married. They own
homes rather than renting far more often, especially compared against Manhattan, where it
is extremely rare to own a home. As the chart of home values shows, those that own homes
in Manhattan usually own homes valued at more than $10,000.
top 100 top 200 top 400
marital, 1920 divorced 2.7 2.0 1.4
(percent) married 83.6 85.5 84.9
single 8.2 7.2 7.2
unknown 1.4 0.7 0.3
widowed 4.1 4.6 6.2
marital, 1930 divorced 2.9 1.5 1.5
(percent) married 78.3 82.7 79.6
single 5.8 6.0 7.2
unknown 0 0 0
widowed 13.0 9.8 11.7
household status, 1920 boarder 0 0 0.3
(percent) brother 1.3 0.7 0.7
brother-in-law 0 0 0.3
daughter 1.3 1.3 1.0
head of household 79.5 83.6 82.8
insane 1.3 0.7 0.3
lodger 1.3 0.7 1.0
son 0 0.7 1.4
wife 15.0 12.5 12.0
mortgage, 1920 free 88.9 87.0 85.8
(percent) mortgage 5.6 8.4 9.3
unknown 5.6 4.7 5.9
Table 4.5.4: Marital status, household status, homeownership
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Figure 4.5.6: 1920 marital status
Figure 4.5.7: 1930 marital status, males
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Figure 4.5.8: 1930 marital status, females
Figure 4.5.9: 1930 homeowner/renter distribution
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Figure 4.5.10: 1930 home values
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Figure 4.5.11: 1930 rents
Birthplaces and Immigration
By far, most of the top 400 were born in New York, with 76 claiming it as their birthplace
in 1920 and 67 in 1930. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio each have more
claiming that as their birthplace than the leading foreign countries, England and Germany.
9 and 11 people claim birth in England and Germany respectively, and in 1930, those numbers
are 9 and 7. Germany is certainly a leader among the birthplaces of parents. There were
33 fathers and 32 mothers born in Germany in the 1920 Census, and in 1930 these numbers
are 30 and 26. 39 fathers and 37 mothers were reported with German as a ﬁrst language in
1920; this question was not asked in 1930.
Of those identifying as immigrants in 1920, 23 report being naturalized, and 2 are aliens.
In 1930, 18 are naturalized and 2 are aliens. In 1920, of the top 400, regardless of immigration
status, 14 report German as their mother tongue, 1 reports Scotch, and the rest do not report
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or report English. In 1930, 7 chose German as their language before living in America, and
the rest report English or do not report.
The Census information shows that Germany and England are among the countries with
the most immigrants to the USA. However, countries like Italy and Russia also supply many
immigrants to the USA, but are vastly underrepresented or not present in the top 400.
Figure 4.5.12: 1930 native/foreign and race statistics, males
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Figure 4.5.13: 1930 countries of origin (white immigrants only)
Occupations
Occupations and industries are self-reported in each year of the Census, with little to no
standardization by the enumerator. The data, without any adjustment, clearly shows that
banking is the most common response to both industry and occupation. Based on the
responses to each question, I assign each member of the top 400 a sector variable in each
year. I report these results in tables below. The most common occupation sector is none,
presumably by those who are retired, while banking and ﬁnance (counted separately for
those who indicated work in ﬁnance, stocks and bonds, or brokerages), manufacturing, and
retailing are other large sectors.
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Sector 1920 percent 1930 percent
Architecture 1 0.4 2 0.8
Art 0 0 1 0.4
Auto 10 3.4 9 3.5
Banking 39 13.5 39 14.9
Business 1 0.4 0 0
Capitalist 1 0.4 2 0.8
Communications 1 0.4 1 0.4
Education 1 0.4 2 0.8
Engineering 2 0.7 3 1.2
Entertainment 2 0.7 1 0.4
Executive 0 1 1 0.4
Farming 3 5.2 2 0.8
Finance 15 4.5 14 5.4
Food Processing 13 1.4 8 3.1
Government 4 0.4 4 1.5
Housewife 1 0 0 0
Lawyer 14 4.8 12 4.6
Lumber 1 0.4 2 0.8
Management 2 0.7 1 0.4
Manager Of Estate 1 0.4 0 0
Manufacturer 40 13.8 33 12.6
Medical 4 1.4 2 0.8
Mining 5 1.7 5 1.9
Oil 4 1.4 4 1.5
Publishing 7 2.4 6 2.3
Railroad 4 1.4 4 1.5
Real Estate 6 2.1 4 1.5
Religion 1 0.4 1 0.4
Retail 20 6.9 15 5.8
Textiles 9 3.1 7 2.7
Tobacco 4 1.4 3 1.2
Transportation 1 0.4 0 0
Utilities 4 1.4 3 1.2
None 68 23.5 70 26.8
Table 4.5.5: Occupation Sectors for the top 400
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I repeat the analysis for the Census occupation classiﬁcations, though I do not ﬁnd these
as enlightening as my own classiﬁcations. In the Census classiﬁcations, all bankers, retailers,
and brokers are classiﬁed under trade, while lawyers and newspaper publishers fall under
professional services.
Figure 4.5.14: Occupations of the top 400, 1920
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Figure 4.5.15: Occupations of the top 400, 1930
Veterans
Veteran status is rare among the top taxpayers. Among the top 100, four are World War
veterans, four are wife of a World War veteran, and one (Bernard Baruch) reports working
on the Peace Conference. Another seven World War veterans appear in ranks 101-200, and
two Spanish-American war veterans are in ranks 201-400, along with eighteen more World
War veterans and another wife of a World War veteran. Overall, there are 5 wives of World
War veterans, 2 Spanish-American war veterans, one Peace Conference worker, and 29 World
War veterans. Of course, this is limited by the observation that the age distribution is higher
for the top 400 than for the general population. Many of the top 400 were simply too old to
serve in World War I.
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Persistence over time
The existence of Treasury memos for 1928-1934 and 1936-1941 gives an opportunity to look
at persistence of high income over time. There are 207 records of high net incomes and
tax payments from 1928-1934 in a memo by Samuel Klaus (Klaus 1935). These are not
necessarily the top 200 incomes or taxes in any particular year, nor the sum of those years.
Therefore, I will refer to them as the elite 200 rather than the top 200 for this period.
These 207 records represent 197 individuals, after trust funds are removed.29 Of these 197,
I can ﬁnd 27 in the top 100, 36 in the top 200, and 53 in the top 400, and 111 overall. 86 of
them cannot be found in 1923-1924 data.
There are 11 names reported among the top 10 (two are married and ﬁled jointly) salaried
workers for 1941. Of these, only two match to 1923/1924, and neither one in the top
400. These two are Eugene Grace and Nicholas Schenck. Eugene Grace was president of
Bethlehem Steel but apparently worked his way to the top from working as a crane operator
(Dictionary of American Biography 1928). Nicholas Schenck was a movie entrepreneur who
also seemed to build his business empire from scratch (American National Biography 1999).
Of the top 100 net incomes in 1941, regardless of salary, seven can be found in the top
100, 11 in the top 200, 17 in the top 400, and 39 overall. Of course, this means that 61 can
not be found in 1923/1924. Again, the result must be carefully stated: about 40 percent of
the top 100 (much more exclusive than the top 5 percent) in 1941 were also in the top 5
percent in 1924.
Unsurprisingly, persistence appears higher for time periods that are closer together. A
majority of those in the Klaus data can be found in 1923-1924, but only about 40 percent
29Doris Duke is the main oﬀender here, as she is listed once as an individual and also has four trust funds
listed.
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can be found in 1941's top 100. However, if the data was more comparable, i.e., if the 1941
data was 1941's top 200 (to be closer to 197) instead of the top 100, perhaps the match rate
would be substantially higher.
4.5.5 Surprising Members
Certainly, the press had some idea of the famous and wealthy names that they might come
across in the tax lists. There were also names that surprised them. On September 2, 1925,
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch provided a list of 159 individuals with over $25,000 in income
who paid no federal income tax.30 The New York Times and Chicago Tribune also made
note of nontaxable returns found in the Collectors' books, but did not ever devote an entire
section to listing them all together.
On Tuesday, October 28, 1924, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer mentioned that the leading
Northern California taxpayer was a complete unknown:
[M]uch to the surprise of bankers and newspapers, Leonard Howarth, of Tacoma
and Santa Rosa, Calif., was revealed as leading the ranks ... with an income tax
payment of $116,061.78.
Inquiry further revealed the fact yesterday that Howarth's business associates are
chieﬂy in Tacoma, that they are few, and that these few are the only people who
know Howarth, his history, and his remarkable ﬁnancial genius.
Howarth... retains his mastery over ﬁnance and divides his time between a bache-
lor life of no social activities in his two sumptuous homes and his many corporate
30While the Collectors were not supposed to let income information be seen, I believe that they did organize
their books by level of income. My best guess is that the Collector's oﬃce had a book composed entirely of




The Seattle Post-Intelligencer was perhaps equally surprised (enough to run an article in
both years) that a woman was the top Seattle taxpayer in each year; Mrs. Harriet W.
Rhodes paid $85,327.05 in 1923 and $24,683.58 in 1924.
Garland Kent provides the best rags-to-riches story in the dataset. In the 1920 Census,
he appears as a poor unmarried farmer in Justice, Texas. After not appearing in tax data
for 1923, he appears for 1924 with the second highest tax in the Dallas district (there are
only two districts in Texas). By 1930, he is married with a son and daughter, and lives in a
$50,000 house with a servant. His self-reported occupation and industry has changed from
general farming to a producer in the oil business. It seems that Mr. Kent struck oil on his
farm and quickly turned into a millionaire.
Bootleggers
The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote that several taxpayers on a Washington list are known to
have been tried and convicted for violation of the Volstead act (September 3, 1925). The
New York Times cited an auditor at the Second District oﬃce who claimed that bootleggers
paid $1.5 million (September 6, 1925):
Mr. Fowler said that one bootlegger took all his books to the income-tax oﬃces,
showed just how much money he had made during 1924 on illicit liquor deals,
and had applied for deductions for losses incurred through the theft of liquor by
hijackers. His case has not yet been decided.
The Chicago Tribune claimed that successful gamblers and bootleggers ﬁled tax returns
under ﬁctitious names:
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A Chicago gambler hit on the idea of using a ﬁctitious name, but before he tried
it he made a few inquiries. He admitted that he had experienced a good year
and had a fat account in a loop bank, but didn't want to be a goldﬁsh... For
the purpose of collecting an income tax, Uncle Sam is not much concerned what
name a taxpayer uses if he kicks in. (September 6, 1925)
TheWashington Post summarized the situation in this way: Either they are fairly honest
or they felt that the enforcement of the income tax is eﬀective and that of the Volstead law
is not (September 10, 1925). This runs against the common perception that bootleggers
did not pay their taxes, exempliﬁed by Al Capone's income tax evasion conviction.
African-American wealth
The Pittsburgh Courier investigated the tax payments of the Harlem 400. The Courier
reported the tax payments of 24 prominent individuals in New York, claiming, The most
astounding fact recently disclosed about the colored Harlem millionaires is that there aren't
any (November 29, 1924). Upon further investigation, the paper concluded that the Harlem
400 was not very wealthy at all, at least based on their income tax payments, and stated
that the 'colored millionaire' was completely punctured by the actual ﬁgures from Collector
Chas. W. Anderson's books (December 20, 1924). The Courier wrote that there was only
one real millionaire that stood up to scrutiny. Terry Holding Company's $4,615 payment
represented the highest amount paid by any New York Negro concern and represents an
income of approximately $80,000 net (December 20, 1924).
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4.5.6 Inheritance or earning
I attempt to determine which taxpayers attained their status by their own fortune or by
the fortune of their ancestors. I link the taxpayer list to a list of large estates until 1921. I
merge only on last name. This creates some problems among the top 400 for the Fords (the
auto fortune and the plate glass fortune are separate), and throughout the dataset for those
with common last names (Smith, Davis, Green, Brown). In the top 400, though, some last
names that are rare do indicate an inherited fortune (Vanderbilt, Guggenheim, Harkness,
Juilliard).
26 in the top 100, 44 in the top 200, and 87 of the top 400 can be matched on exact last
name to a large estate. This rate is fairly constant around 20-25 percent. However, seven
of the top ten are linked to a large estate.31 The most common occurring of these names is
Ford, from Edward Ford's plate glass empire, but he is incorrectly linked to Henry and Edsel
Ford. He is, however, correctly linked to other Fords in the Toledo area who are involved
in the plate glass industry. The Whitneys appear 4 times in the top 400, but no other last
name appears more than 3 times, with most occurring just once.
29 of the 239 large estates do not match to anybody in the data (even outside the top 400)
on exact last name. But 3,759 of 40,411 total observations can be linked to a large estate,
and very frequently each estate is linked more than once. Overall, just over ten percent of
large estates do not seem to appear in the next generation, and just under ten percent of
next generation observations can be linked back to a large estate in a previous generation.
This does seem to indicate a large amount of turnover at the very top, but many people
could be linked to wealthy families without an estate crossing the $10 million threshold for
31The seven are Henry and Edsel Ford, Payne Whitney, Anna and Edward Harkness, Clinton Crane, and
Anna Thompson Dodge. Of these, the Fords are self-made (though Edsel is wealthy due to his still-living
father's fortune), but the Harknesses and Anna Dodge are widows and/or heirs.
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inclusion in Klein. Klein's list should be interpreted carefully, as a measure of estates that
are extremely large, and only inclusive of those with ancestors who died in the time period
before 1921. For example, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., is not linked to any large estate, though
he owes his fortune to his still living and still earning father. The others in the top ten who
cannot be linked to any past large estate are brothers Andrew and Richard Mellon, who
deﬁnitely came from wealthy origins. Really, the only person in the top 10 who made their
own fortune is Henry Ford.
4.5.7 Wealthy families
Gary Becker (1973) introduces the theory of assortative mating, that is, marriage between
two people who both have high levels of a particular trait, like earnings or education. Green-
wood et al. (2014) test the theory of assortative mating in the US from 1960-2005. They
ﬁnd that assortative mating has risen and that it has a large eﬀect on income inequality.
The top end of the 1924 tax list gives some indication of intermarriage between wealthy
families. Certainly the Rockefeller daughters married into other rich families like the Mc-
Cormicks and the Prentices. But many women in the data appear to be wealthy only from
inheriting from their parents or husbands. Some, like Kate Wilson (Taylor) Winthrop, have
higher incomes than their still-living husbands. However, if married taxpayers ﬁling jointly
only appear in the newspaper under one spouse's name, this may obscure marriages between
wealthy families. Overall, the data does not lend itself to determining the heritage of each
taxpayer and their spouse.
It is much easier to use this data to determine the family relationships between those in the
top 400. Several father-son pairs appear, including the Rockefellers, Fords, and Harknesses.
There are also sets of siblings. The Havemeyer siblings, Electra Webb, Adaline Frelinghuysen,
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and Horace Havemeyer, occupy spots 47, 49, and 51 in 1924. Brothers Stephen and Jesse
Metcalf are in 69th and 70th place. It is not clear whether such similar incomes result from
an inheritance in that tax year, a dividend, or income from a family business.
4.5.8 A Superstar Economy?
Sherwin Rosen (1981) introduced the economics of superstars. He theorizes that while en-
tertainers do not face changes in demand curves, there are changes in technology that aﬀect
supply. Radio, television, and recording give performances the qualities of club or public
goods. Rosen rejects that inﬂation alone can explain high superstar earnings, and predicts
that cable, video cassettes, and home computers will increase the superstar share of earn-
ings even more (Rosen 1981, 857).32
Entertainers and sports stars do not occupy many spots at the top of the tax payment
lists. The only actor in the list seems to be Douglas Fairbanks, at rank 150. George Herman
Babe Ruth paid $3,433 in 1924 taxes, good enough to place him behind about 10,000 other
wealthy New Yorkers. He does not appear in 1923. Boxer William Harrison Jack Dempsey
paid $90,831 in 1923, but only $267 in 1924.33 He ranked around 350th in 1923, which is
quite high, but still lower than many lawyers, bankers, and inheritors.
The entertainment weekly Variety ran names and tax payments of individuals and cor-
porations that it considered to be in the entertainment business in both 1924 and 1925. I
compile the top 25 in each year in tables below. I also give an occupation for each. In most
cases, those dominating the top of the list are theater owners, ﬁlm producers, or other exec-
utives or professionals in the entertainment industry. Superstars like actors or professional
32I believe what Rosen is suggesting here is that though the nominal incomes have clearly increased to
previously unheard-of numbers, the real incomes have also increased.
33It seems Dempsey boxed in 1923, but did not box in 1924, so his income would have been much lower.
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athletes do not frequently appear in the top 25. On the overall list of taxpayers, the highest
superstar, Douglas Fairbanks, ranks 88th in 1923 and 150th in 1924. However, Al Jolson
ranks 866th in 1923 and Harold Lloyd is 2015th in 1924. Each appears in 25th place on the
Variety list in one of the two years, and Jolson is the 5th actor or athlete in 1923, while
Lloyd is the 8th actor or athlete in 1924. It appears that superstars did not often outrank
bankers or executives in income. By 1941, there is some possibility that this has changed,
as Charlie Chaplin appeared on the Morgenthau memo as 1941's 11th highest taxpayer.
The results lend some support to Rosen's hypothesis. While radio and ﬁlm have helped
some attain superstar status by 1924, the Variety lists show that only a handful of entertain-
ers can earn more than a New York lawyer or banker. Superstars today seem to occupy much
more of the top income classes, and this would support Rosen's idea that the superstar class
takes a higher share of income over time with changes in technology. Changes in technology
are probably only part of the story, since the procedure of projecting a movie onto a theater
screen has hardly changed since 1924, as earnings seem to have greatly increased. This in-
crease seems much larger than the increase in the size of the audience due to television and
home video. Instead, aspects of institutions like the studio system or the design of sports
contracts must also matter.34
34The studio system was a system of vertically integrated ﬁlm producers, distributors, and exhibitors that
the US Supreme Court found anticompetitive in US v. Paramount Pictures (1948). The reserve clause
allowed the ﬁrst baseball team to sign a player to sign him indeﬁnitely, thus suppressing salaries. It was
challenged in Flood v. Kuhn (1972) and replaced by free agency through collective bargaining.
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rank last ﬁrst payment city occupation
1 Mackay Clarence H 488353 New York ﬁnance
2 Ryan Thomas Fortune 475416 New York ﬁnance
3 Hancock G Allan 449292 Los Angeles oil
4 Mclean Edward B 422849 Washington DC publisher
5 Steur Max D 279226 New York lawyer
6 Ramish Adolph 252301 Los Angeles theater owner,
oil tycoon
7 Fairbanks Douglas 225769 Los Angeles actor
8 Pulitzer Herbert 198371 New York publisher
9 Kahn Otto H 184984 New York ﬁnance
10 Hanna H M Jr 155867 Pittsburgh oil, coal, steel
11 Hanna L C Jr 152155 Pittsburgh oil, coal, steel
12 Juilliard F J A 148334 New York merchant
13 Hertz John 100258 Chicago theater owner
14 Albee Edward F 94989 New York theater owner
15 Dempsey Jack (Wm Harrison) 90831 New York boxer
16 Cohan George M 87656 New York actor,
playwright,
composer
17 Pulitzer Ralph 83619 New York publisher
18 Kearns Jack 71657 New York boxing manager
19 Bowman John Mce. 69658 New York hotel owner
20 Lasky Jesse 62866 Los Angeles ﬁlm producer
21 Moreno Daisy C 59154 Los Angeles wife of actor
22 Nichols Ann 52673 New York playwright
23 Meighan Thomas 51239 New York actor
24 Laemmle Carl 50249 New York ﬁlm producer
25 Jolson Al 45070 New York actor/singer
Table 4.5.6: Variety top 25, 1923 tax payments
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rank last ﬁrst payment city occupation
1 Mclean Edward B 281125 Washington DC publisher
2 Steuer Max D 198455 New York lawyer
3 Fairbanks Douglas 182190 Los Angeles actor
4 Lasker A D 122004 Chicago advertiser
5 Ochs Adolph 66394 New York publisher
6 Albee Edward F 61735 New York theater owner
7 Laemmle Carl 59862 New York ﬁlm producer
8 Swanson Gloria 57625 Los Angeles actress
9 Moreno Daisy C 55219 Los Angeles oil heiress, wife
of Antonio
Moreno
10 Scribner Charles 53662 New York publisher
11 Lasky Jesse L 48592 Los Angeles ﬁlm producer
12 Rogers Saul E 46399 New York lawyer for ﬁlm
company
13 Zukor Adolph 44540 New York ﬁlm producer
14 Hearst William R. 42239 New York publisher
15 Nichols Anne 41425 New York playwright
16 Cruze James 40353 Los Angeles actor/director
17 Gish Lillian 36967 New York actress
18 Mcginley Walter T 36025 Los Angeles theater owner
and oil tycoon
19 Pickford Mary 34387 Los Angeles actress
20 Pickford Charlotte 34267 Los Angeles actress
21 Jolson Al 33744 New York actor/singer
22 Lauder E G Jr 33225 New York doctor
23 Harris John P 31289 Pittsburgh theater owner
24 Day Joseph P 28517 New York real estate
25 Lloyd Harold C 28151 Los Angeles actor
Table 4.5.7: Variety top 25, 1924 tax payments
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4.6 Conclusion
Despite privacy issues surrounding individual tax payments, at least three lists of high-
income taxpayers exist in the period 1923-1941. I ﬁnd 1924's top 400 taxpayers in the 1920
and 1930 US Federal Census, with a relatively high match rate for the period, though this
is aided by the fame of the individuals. This chapter presents demographic statistics from
those Censuses. Unsurprisingly, the rich are rich, and they own expensive houses and employ
several servants each on average. They have an average age in their 50s through the 1920s.
They usually did not serve in wars, but this may be have been limited by their ages. They
also frequently work in banking and ﬁnance, with executives in automotive-related businesses
and other manufacturers also making large fortunes.
The rich enjoy some level of persistence of high incomes over time. Nine of the top ten
in 1924 came from wealthy parents, and sometimes built even larger fortunes. About ten
percent of individuals in the 1923 and 1924 tax lists share a last name with somebody who
died and left a large (over $10 million) estate. About 90 percent of individuals who died
leaving a large estate share their last name with somebody in the 1923-1924 tax list. About
half of those who appear in the elite 200 in 1928-1934 also appear in the 1923-1924 tax lists.




Tax Cuts and Response
5.1 Introduction
The federal personal income tax had a turbulent early history. At its inception in 1913,
marginal rates ranged from 1 to 7 percent. World War I pushed the rates as high as 77
percent in 1918, and interwar tax cuts reduced the highest marginal rate to 24 percent by
1929. In the 1920s, Republican presidents and their Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew
Mellon, planned and passed a series of tax cuts through Congress. These bills, the Revenue
Acts of 1921, 1924, and 1926, each cut normal tax and surtax rates on individual ordinary
income. Several studies debate the eﬀect of these tax cuts on revenue collections.
This paper examines an interesting and understudied chapter in the interwar period. A
provision for public inspection of income tax returns became law in June 1924. Before its
amendment (and eﬀective repeal) in 1926, major newspapers across the country ran tens
of thousands of names, addresses, and tax payments for the tax years 1923 and 1924. The
Revenue Act of 1924 also cut marginal tax rates across the board. Thus, a unique opportunity
exists to match individual taxpayers across two years and two rate structures and examine
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response using the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate
(ETI). Using data from the New York Times, I have constructed a dataset of just over 10,000
individuals whose entries can be considered matches between the two years.
Many papers in the public ﬁnance literature estimate the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI). The ETI basically tells you what will happen to the government's tax revenue when
it changes its marginal tax rates. This is one of the most important questions in public
ﬁnance, if, after all, the goal is to gain a set amount of revenue for the government at a
minimal eﬃciency cost. If the government cuts marginal tax rates by 5 percent, the ETI will
tell you the eﬀect on tax receipts.
For a mental example, I recommend thinking of a tax system with just a few brackets
and rates, and hypothetical tax cuts that aﬀect all marginal rates the same, proportionally.
Remember that a tax rate cut is actually an increase in the net-of-tax rate, and also remember
that the ETI measures the change in taxable income, not the change in tax receipts. Then,
in the example I recommend, you can picture tax receipts as the product of tax rates and
taxable income (really, some vector of each of these). In my simple example, I want you to
picture all tax rates changing proportionally equally; when that is true, the eﬀective tax rate
will make an equal proportional change.
If tax receipts go up when the net-of-tax rate goes up, then we are on the right side of the
infamous Laﬀer curve. If tax receipts go down when the net-of-tax rate goes up, we are on
the left side. The ﬁrst situation is a positive ETI greater than one. The second situation is
an ETI between 0 and 1. If the ETI is close to 1, then the government will see very similar
revenues from any (small) change in tax rates. But if the ETI is positive and close to 0, then
income is not very responsive to changes in the tax rate, and as a result, tax receipts will fall
almost proportionally to the changes in tax rates. In this last case, remember that income
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will not change much, but of course, tax receipts are the tax rate (which is changed) times
taxable income (not much changed), so the source of the changes in receipts comes almost
entirely from the change in the tax rate.
The economist must perform some minor transformations to compute the numbers cor-
rectly. The marginal tax rate cut of 5 percent needs to be translated into a percent change
in the marginal net-of-tax rate. The marginal net-of-tax rate will be the take home part of
income after taxes. If a marginal tax rate is 40 percent, the corresponding marginal net-of-
tax rate is 60 percent. And if that marginal tax rate was cut from 40 percent to 35 percent,
then the marginal net-of-tax rate climbs from 60 percent to 65 percent. The percent change
is then 5 percent divided by 60 percent, giving a percent increase in the marginal net-of-tax
rate of about 8.3 percent.35
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Literature
An excellent summary of the theory and evidence in ETI research is found in Goolsbee et al.
(1999). The ETI is a measure of total response to tax rate changes, regardless of the cause.
The measure should not be construed to mean anything more than it does. For instance,
taxable income is a function of both real income and deduction choices, among other things,
so implications for economic growth, broadly deﬁned, are very limited. Generally speaking,
more recent work estimating the ETI has been able to use conﬁdential panel data, but
attempts to analyze the ETI in historical periods must rely on aggregate data. Goolsbee et al.
35I use the original net of tax rate as the base in this example for simplicity, but in practice, the literature
uses logarithms.
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(1999) estimates the ETI around the 1924 tax cuts using data from the Statistics of Income.
Through diﬀerent estimation procedures and diﬀerent comparison groups, he computes an
overall ETI around 0.5 and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence ETIs from 0.6 to 1.2. However, in other
periods of tax cuts or tax increases that Goolsbee analyzes, he ﬁnds estimates of the ETI
that are near zero or negative. Feldstein (1995) uses a panel of 4,000 taxpayers around the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 to estimate an ETI of at least 1. Auten and Carroll (1999) use the
Statistics of Income Individual Income Tax Files to create a dataset of 15,579 households in
1985 and 1989. Their range of assumptions gives ETIs ranging from 0.4 to 0.7, and usually
around 0.6. Gruber and Saez (2002) use a panel from 1979-1990 to estimate an overall ETI
of 0.4, but an ETI of 0.57 for those with incomes greater than $100,000, and an ETI less
than a third as large for the complement. In particular, they found that those who itemize
show larger responses.
Smiley and Keehn (1995) study the tax cuts of the 1920s and determine that overall tax
revenue increased after and because of tax cuts. This hints at an ETI of greater than 1,
but their analysis uses the number of taxpayers as the dependent variable rather than the
amount of taxable income. In a forthcoming paper analyzing the aggregate data from the
Statistics of Income, David and Christina Romer ﬁnd an ETI around 0.2 with a t-statistic
over 6 for the period from 1919 to 1941. For the restricted sample period from 1923 to 1932,









Romer & Romer 1919-1941 full interwar
period
0.2 0.31





Smiley & Keehn 1915-1929 elasticity of
number of ﬁlers
implied ETI>1 implied ETI>1
Table 5.2.1: Estimated ETIs in previous studies
This paper will fall in the same period that Smiley and Keehn, Romer and Romer, and
Goolsbee analyze, but will make a contribution with a new dataset that includes individual
taxpayers who can be followed between two years.
5.2.2 Other changes in the Revenue Act of 1924
Chapter two features a longer discussion of the tax code of the 1920s, and changes in 1924.
A brief summary of changes follows here.
• All taxes owed for tax year 1923 are subject to a 25 percent rebate, described below.
• Earned income is introduced as an adjustment. Earned income is taxed at a 25 percent
lower rate (e.g., a marginal rate of 30 instead of 40). Earned income is deﬁned as the
ﬁrst $5,000 of income, or $10,000 for those with incomes over $10,000. For those with
incomes between $5,000 and $10,000, earned income is deﬁned as at least $5,000.
• A small loophole regarding capital net losses is closed. Previously, capital net losses
could be deducted from ordinary income or capital gains income, while capital gains
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were taxed at the 12.5 percent capital gains rate. Closing the loophole means that
no less tax can be paid than what would be paid if capital gains and losses worked
to cancel each other out (rather than having capital net losses reduce a larger surtax
rate).
• The gift tax is introduced (but repealed and retroactively rebated in the Revenue Act
of 1926).
• The Board of Tax Appeals is given independence from the US Treasury, instead of its
previous location at the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of the IRS.
• Assorted other tax changes include, for example, the repeal of a candy tax and soft
drink tax.36
Ex-post adjustment
The Revenue Act of 1924 included a one time 25 percent rebate on 1923's taxes, after they
had been paid. The Chicago Tribune claims multiple times that they run the numbers
post-deduction, while the New York Times claims multiple times that they run them pre-
deduction. When the Chicago Tribune runs New York numbers, they say that the New York
oﬃce's numbers are not adjusted for the 25 percent deduction.
36
Numerous excise taxes are reduced or repealed. Among the taxes repealed are those on telephone
and telegraph messages, candy, soft drinks, inexpensive jewelry, certain sporting and traveling
goods, certain furnishings and ﬁxtures, admissions costing 50 cents or less, truck chassis sold
for $1,000 or less, automobile truck and wagon bodies sold for $200 or less, and stamp taxes
on promissory notes. Taxes upon tires, inner tubes and accessories, except when sold to man-
ufacturers, are reduced from 5 per cent to 2 1/2 per cent, but taxes upon automobiles other
than those mentioned above are not changed. The heavy taxes upon tobacco and manufactures
thereof are unchanged. (Blakey 1924, 476-477)
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To correctly analyze behavioral response (those taxpayers did not know a year in advance
that the tax rates would all be cut 25 percent after the fact), the payments in 1923 must be
adjusted up by 1/3 to what they originally thought they were paying. It is not clear if the
1924 numbers are the tax payments after the 1923 rebate or before, but in analyzing New
York tax payments, I trust the statements of both the Tribune and Times that the numbers
are from before the change.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Source
In October 1924, major newspapers, including the New York Times, New York Herald Tri-
bune, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, and many others named in chapter two, began
running lists of tens of thousands of names, addresses, and tax payments for both individuals
and corporations. Despite confusion at the time, this was probably expected, since Coolidge
noted his displeasure with the publicity provision in his response to the new law, and the
text was printed in major newspapers (New York Times, June 3, 1924). Major newspapers
again ran tens of thousands of names, addresses, and tax payments in September of 1925.
A contemporary account of the mayhem can be found in Atwood (1926). I have digitized
the New York Times records, and over 27,000 entries resulted from the fall 1924 lists (tax
year 1923) and over 44,000 entries came from the fall 1925 lists (tax year 1924). I matched
these using the RECLINK command in STATA (available from RePEc). Using RECLINK,
I matched progressively on exact name and address, exact name and fuzzy address, fuzzy
name and exact address, and fuzzy name and address. Entries were then checked by hand.
A more detailed description of the matching process is in the data appendix. Computer code
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is available by request.
After removing duplicates, estates, corporations, and people outside the New York area,
there are 18,150 records in 1923 and 29,921 records in 1924. Of these, 11,774 match. The
address ﬁeld is given in 16,001 of 18,150 records in 1923, and in 28,651 of 29,921 records
from 1924. I do not perform any data analysis with the 824 estates or 12,798 corporations.
In other cities, there are 713 matches out of 1310 (1923) and 3290 (1924) entries. Address
is given for 538 (1923) and 1504 (1924) of them.
In Chicago, after removing duplicates, estates, corporations, and people outside the
Chicago area, there are 4,954 records in 1923 and 12,077 records in 1924. Of these, 1,555
match. The address ﬁeld is almost never given in 1923 but almost always given in 1924. I do
not perform any data analysis with the 190 estates or 1,280 corporations. William Wrigley,
Jr., is the largest taxpayer in 1923 at $836,665, but he pays only around $2,000 in 1924 (the
newspapers explain that Wrigley had a large, one time capital gain in 1923). 1924's highest
is 1923's second highest, Richard T. Crane, Jr. Four members of the McCormick family
appear in the top 10.
For the rest of the chapter, I focus on payments within the New York area printed in the
New York Times. I do this to avoid any discrepancies between papers in printing decisions,
particularly with respect to the 25 percent rebate on 1923 taxes. This is not as large of an
issue in chapter four, since I focus in that case on large tax payments in only the second
year, rather than a change between years, and there is no rebate in the second year.
Computing Taxable Income
I have computed taxable income in two ways. The ﬁrst assumes personal exemptions only
were claimed, and deduces taxable income based on the assumption that all tax paid was on
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ordinary income. The second uses the Statistics of Income for years 1923 and 1924, which
present fairly detailed aggregate statistics by income bracket. I have used these numbers to
determine how much the average taxpayer in each bracket paid in normal tax and surtax,
how many deductions were claimed, and how much income was from capital gains rather than
ordinary income. I computed the average tax paid and average net income and interpolated
these numbers for all matches in my sample. Throughout the chapter, I refer to the ﬁrst
measure as the taxable income, and the second measure as the imputed taxable income.
Additionally, for the ﬁrst method, I computed the marginal tax rate faced by each taxpayer
on their last dollar of taxable income. I also computed what the marginal tax rate would
have been in each year if the laws of the other year had been in eﬀect. In other words,
for a taxpayer in 1923 with an estimated taxable income of $6,000, I assigned both the
marginal tax rate determined by the Revenue Act of 1921 and the Revenue Act of 1924.
By this method, I hope to avoid spurious correlations that can easily result from analysis of
across-the-board tax cuts.
Interestingly, the numbers for taxable incomes align quite well when using either method
of income computation. While one might not expect the ﬁrst method (which assumes only
personal exemptions, no deductions, and all ordinary income) to match very well, it is
possible that the use of exemptions and the shifting of income toward capital gains may
oﬀset each other and the estimated taxable income is accurate. However, even if this were
true, the marginal tax rate computed by the ﬁrst method would not be accurate. The large
share of capital gains in this case would imply a lower surtax rate than if all income were
ordinary..
Newspapers often printed a table for translating the tax payments in their pages to
taxable incomes. This formula is uniform across newspapers and corresponds exactly to the
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1923 and 1924 rate schedule on ordinary income with the standard deduction.
5.3.2 Sample characteristics
Since the dataset is new and since newspaper editors may have been swayed to exclude certain
records from their lists, I will compare the dataset against aggregate statistics presented in
the Statistics of Income. I will also present information that determines consistency of the
rank of each taxpayer. This will be important in determining how important the assumption
of rank preservation is in studies with aggregate data.
Some perspective on the size of the sample can be gained by comparing the number of
returns with more than $20,000 of income in the sample against the number in New York
or the whole United States. In 1923, the sample has 7,486 individuals with over $20,000
in income. New York had 20,647, and the USA had 80,783. In 1924, the sample has 7,987
individuals with over $20,000 in income. New York had 25,969, and the USA had 96,434.
The sample therefore contains a number roughly equivalent to 1/3 of the number of ﬁlers in
New York in each year and 1/12 of the number of ﬁlers in the country.
The next piece of information that describes whether the sample is representative is the
number of ﬁlers in each income group relative to the total number of ﬁlers in each income
group. Appendix ﬁgures in section C.2 show probability densities for both years with a
minimum cutoﬀ of $20,000. In general, the sample underestimates up to about $40,000 and




Rank preservation is an important assumption in analyzing the ETI with aggregate data.
Aggregate data does not identify the taxpayers in each income class, so other studies, espe-
cially those covering the 1920s, will often use rank preservation. Usually, the aggregate data
on income is mapped to a Pareto distribution, and each ranked taxpayer can be assigned an
income. When analyzing behavioral response, it is necessary to follow taxpayers across years.
Rank preservation allows for the nth ranked taxpayers in each year to be linked together. If
rank preservation is not a valid assumption, then estimates from studies based upon it may
not be reliable.
I use my 1923-1924 tax payment dataset to compute the ranks of each individual based
on their taxable income in each year. The rank 1 is the largest tax payment in each year,
while higher deciles (i.e. 10 is higher than 1) correspond to larger payments and incomes.
Note that it does not matter whether I use payment data or computed taxable income since
my formulas are linear, monotone transformations of payment data, so the ranks will be the
same no matter which measure is used. To simplify the presentation of tens of thousands of
observations, I group the taxpayers into deciles in each year. I also note if they are in the
dataset in one year and missing in the other.
I present taxpayers by their decile in each year in Figure 5.3.1. Perfect rank preservation
would be a set of solid orange boxes from the bottom left to the top right with white boxes
everywhere else. The data here are scattered across the grid, but most taxpayers stay in
the same decile or a similar decile; oﬀ diagonal boxes tend to shade much lighter than the
diagonal boxes. Boxes are shaded darker towards the upper right of the heat map. This
indicates that taxpayers at the top are more likely to stay near their own decile than those
farther down the distribution.
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Figure 5.3.1: Number of individuals by decile and year
The one alarming trend is that the number of missing taxpayers is quite high regardless
of decile in either year. This is particularly true for those who appear in 1924 but not 1923.
Of course, as the number of records in the newspaper was much higher in 1924, this is to
be expected. Only about 27,000 entries appeared in 1923, while about 44,000 appeared in
1924. Therefore, automatically, about 17,000 of those 44,000 people will not be matched.37
Certainly, those who go from any decile to missing have experienced a larger drop in income
or tax payment than those who drop to the lowest decile. For those people, rank preservation
is certainly not true. Generally speaking, though, the payments, and therefore incomes, of
37The number will not be exactly that due to duplicates, corporations, estates, etc., but will still be a
large fraction of those appearing in 1924.
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those at the top are consistent between the years. Heatmaps showing row and column
percentages can be found in the appendix.
Due to the chaotic origin of tax publicity, newspaper reporters were not as prepared
to print tens of thousands of names in 1924 as they were in 1925. The number of names
printed in the second year is substantially higher than the ﬁrst and far outpaced the growth
in taxpayers who paid more than $500 in tax. It is very possible, perhaps even likely, that
the newspapers were overwhelmed and left oﬀ a number of 1923's taxpayers who would then
appear again in 1924. If this is the case, then support for rank preservation is even stronger
than what I have shown here, and studies of the ETI which rely on rank preservation may
rest on fairly strong foundations after all.
5.4 Analysis
5.4.1 Response regardless of tax rate
Before computing a complicated statistic, I ﬁrst present percent changes of each individual's
tax payment. I computed the ratio of 1924 tax to 1923 tax as tax24/tax23.
Figure 5.4.1 will set our expectations for the elasticity of taxable income. If in general,
individuals pay the same amount in tax (distribution centered about 1), then the ETI is
likely about equal to 1; that is, the large cut in tax rates must have been accompanied by
an increase in taxable incomes of approximately the same percent. If, however, individuals
see a 25 percent cut in taxes and their tax payments decrease by about 25 percent, then the
ETI is close to 0; that is, there has been no response. If taxes are cut by about 25 percent,
but tax payments decrease by less than 25 percent, then the ETI is probably somewhere
between zero and one.
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What we see in ﬁgure 5.4.1 is a large group of individuals whose tax payment in 1924 is
50-70 percent the size of their payment in 1923. This is somewhat surprising; the tax cut of
1924 was intended to be stimulative, resulting in higher incomes. Instead, the eﬀect shown
in ﬁgure 5.4.1 is that while tax rates declined by about 25 percent across the board, tax
payments declined by even more than that. This prepares us for a small or perhaps negative
elasticity of taxable income.
Figure 5.4.1: Histogram: New York 1924 payments divided by 1923 payments.
Table 5.4.1 presents statistics on the number of returns, taxable returns, total income,
and total tax paid in the United States for 1923 and 1924. The tax for 1923 is adjusted up
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by 1/3; this accounts for the Statistics of Income reporting the ﬁnal amount, post-rebate.
Table 5.4.1's implications for the ETI are quite diﬀerent. While tax rates were cut about
25 percent, tax collections went down only 20 percent. We also see that income grew by
just over 3 percent. Of course, these two statistics support each other; the rise in income is
certainly part of the reason that tax collections did not fall the full 25 percent, and the tax
collections falling only 20 percent indicates that taxable incomes must have risen.
The implications for the ETI here are slightly diﬀerent from those of ﬁgure 5.4.1. Taxes
were cut in 1924 by about 25 percent, and incomes rose, but not anywhere near 25 percent.
From this, we expect that the ETI will be positive, but small.
returns Taxable returns income tax
1923 7,698,321 4,270,121 24,840,137,364 884,868,673
1924 7,369,788 4,489,698 25,656,153,454 704,265,390
change -328,533 219,577 816,016,090 -180,603,283
percent -4.27 5.14 3.29 -20.41
Table 5.4.1: 1923 and 1924 aggregate tax information
5.4.2 The ETI
To compute the elasticity of taxable income, Gruber and Saez (2002) recommend, and I use,
the regression
log(z2/z1) = α0 + ζlog[(1− T ′2)/(1− T ′1)] + ηlog[(z2 − T2(z2))/(z1 − T1(z1)] + α1log(z1) + 
where zi is the taxable income in year i, Ti(zj) is the total tax paid, with the income tax
rules of year i and the income of year j, and T ′i is the marginal tax rate in year i.
I use the standard instruments in the literature. Instruments are necessary because of the
136
progressivity of the tax code. When there is a positive shock to income that is not explained
by any variable, then >0, and therefore the tax rate will increase automatically. This will
lead to a correlation with both log[(1− T ′2)/(1− T ′1)], the log change in marginal net-of-tax
rates,38 and log[(z2−T2(z2))/(z1−T1(z1)], the log change in after-tax income.39 Let T ′p equal
the predicted marginal tax rate in year 2 if income is unchanged. Then the instruments
log[(1 − T ′p)/(1 − T ′1)], the log change in marginal net-of-tax rates if the law changes and
income does not, and log[(z1 − T2(z1))/(z1 − T1(z1)], the log change in after tax income if
the law changes and income does not, will isolate the change in the tax laws by assuming
income is unchanged between the two years.
I use the payments in each year to compute taxable income in the same year, as well as
the marginal tax rate in both years. I use 1923 payments to compute 1923 income, and the
1923 marginal tax rate. I then use the 1923 computed income to calculate the hypothetical
marginal tax rate in 1924 if income had been unchanged. It is standard in the literature to
use these simulated instruments, though their validity is debated; see Weber (2013).40
38An unexplained positive shock to income will increase the tax rate (for at least some people), and the
ratio changes as a result.
39An unexplained positive shock to income will increase after-tax income as long as the marginal tax rate
is less than 100 percent.
40Perhaps the term instrument should be saved for situations where the instrument is not simulated, but
I keep the terminology from the literature.
While Weber prefers the Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment Eﬀect to measure response, that approach is
impractical here due to the much larger number of tax brackets in the 1920s, relative to the modern system.
In the 1920s, the only taxpayers who would stay within the same bracket year to year were the handful at
the very top.
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Figure 5.4.2: Summary of New York regression results
The results of these regressions are reported in ﬁgure 5.4.2. The regression above with
instrumental variables for New York returns an elasticity of taxable income of 0.080, with a
standard error of 0.071.
When outliers with enormous percent changes in taxable income (greater than a multi-
ple of 10 diﬀerence) are removed, the estimate changes to 0.288, statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent level with a standard error of 0.088 and R2 of 0.74.
When looking at only the top 500 taxpayers in each year, the elasticity rises to 0.387 with a
standard error of 0.127. Dropping the log of ﬁrst year taxable income increases the estimate
even further, to 0.586, with a standard error of 0.164.
5.4.3 High R2 in Elasticity of Taxable Income Estimation
In the regressions without instrumental variables, the R2 appears as 1 in the table of results.
The R2 is actually rounded from 0.99 or higher, and is not the result of pure collinearity
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due to generated variables. In this section, I show why the R2 is so high. Begin with the
standard equation in the literature,
log(z2/z1) =α0 + ζlog[(1− T ′2)/(1− T ′1)]
+ ηlog[(z2 − T2(z2))/(z1 − T1(z1)]
+ α1log(z1) + 
Consider the left side, and the second independent variable. Use the logarithm identities
log(a ∗ b) = log(a) + log(b) and log(a/b) = log(a)− log(b) to rearrange:
log(z2)− log(z1) =α0 + ζ[log(1− T ′2)− log(1− T ′1)]
+ η[log(z2 − T2(z2))− log(z1 − T1(z1)]
+ α1log(z1) + 
Factor out z1and z2 from the right side logarithms, and use the multiplication identity:
log(z2)− log(z1) =α0 + ζ[log(1− T ′2)− log(1− T ′1)]
+ η[(log(z2) + log(1− T2(z2)/z2))
− (log(z1) + log(1− T1(z1)/z1))]
+ α1log(z1) + 
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Combine the log(zi) terms on the right to get:
log(z2)− log(z1) =α0 + ζ[log(1− T ′2)− log(1− T ′1)]
+ η[log(z2)− log(z1)]
+ η[log(1− T2(z2)/z2)− log(1− T1(z1)/z1)]
+ α1log(z1) + 
Look at log(1−T2(z2)/z2)). Since T2(z2) is the tax paid on an income of z2, then T2(z2)/z2
is taxes paid as a fraction of income. Then 1− (T2(z2)/z2) is after-tax income as a fraction
of pre-tax income.
In the case of a progressive income tax system and tax cuts across all brackets, then
[log(1−T2(z2)/z2))−log(1−T1(z1)/z1))], which represents the log change in after-tax income
as a fraction of pre-tax income, is strongly negatively correlated with the left side, log(z2)−
log(z1). The reasoning here is straightforward. Take a base year income, marginal tax rate,
and average tax rate to be given. Also assume that there is a tax reform that cuts all
marginal tax rates. The key insight is that the progressivity of the income tax implies that
an increase in income causes an increase in the marginal tax rate (weakly)41 and an increase
in the average tax rate (always)42.
Now consider three cases: no change in income, an increase in income, and a decrease in
income, all relative to the base year. In the case of no change in income (the ﬁrst case),
log(z2) − log(z1) is zero. Because of a tax cut in all marginal rates, [log(1 − T2(z2)/z2)) −
41This is only not true if an individual stays within the same marginal tax rate bracket.
42This is true even within the same bracket, since the marginal is higher than the average, and pulls the
average up. Even in the lowest bracket, the existence of an exemption allows for the marginal to be always
higher than the average.
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log(1 − T1(z1)/z1))] will be small and positive; the after-tax share of income in the second
year must be larger than in the ﬁrst year due to the tax cut, so the diﬀerence in their logs
will be positive. Now consider the case of a decrease in income. Then log(z2) − log(z1) is
negative, and therefore smaller than in the ﬁrst case. But the after-tax share of income is
larger than in the ﬁrst case due to the progressivity of the income tax, and so, [log(1 −
T2(z2)/z2))− log(1−T1(z1)/z1))] is larger than in the ﬁrst case. In the case of an increase in
income, log(z2)− log(z1) is positive, and therefore larger than in the ﬁrst case. But the after-
tax share of income is smaller than in the ﬁrst case due to the progressivity of the income
tax, and so, [log(1−T2(z2)/z2))− log(1−T1(z1)/z1))] is smaller than in the ﬁrst case. Since
the hypothetical tax cut here aﬀects all tax brackets, then this logic holds regardless of the
chosen starting income.
In that case, which is true for the Revenue Act of 1924, the coeﬃcient η will estimate the
changes in the left side of the equation, log(z2)− log(z1), due to itself, log(z2)− log(z1), plus
a term, [log(1−T2(z2)/z2))− log(1−T1(z1)/z1))], with which it is correlated. In this dataset,
log(z2)−log(z1) and [log(1−T2(z2)/z2))−log(1−T1(z1)/z1))] have a correlation coeﬃcient of
-0.8523, while log(z2)−log(z1) and log[(z2−T2(z2))/(z1−T1(z1)] have a correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.9959.
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Figure 5.4.3: Scatterplot showing strong positive correlation in left side and dependent
variable
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Figure 5.4.4: Scatterplot showing strong negative correlation between left side and after-tax
share of income
5.4.4 Staying in the sample
The newspapers frequently mentioned that high-income people were upset that their names,
addresses, and tax payments are running in the newspaper along with their addresses and
tax payments. Since these people were quite rich, and potentially very powerful and angry,
there is some chance that they could have encouraged the newspaper to not run their name
in the second year. I run a logit model to see if there is any relationship between showing
up in the second year and income in the ﬁrst year. I set an indicator variable equal to one
if present in 1923 and 1924. The indicator equals zero if present in 1923 but absent in 1924.
There is a positive relationship between the log of income in year 1 and appearing in the
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data in year 2 (coeﬃcient: 0.543, standard error 0.026), statistically signiﬁcant at the 99.999
percent level. In short, taxpayers can not opt out that easily.
This conﬁrms a trend seen in the deciles heatmap. Though there are many missing
observations in one of the two years, these people are more often found near the bottom of
the distribution in the year that I observe them.
5.5 Conclusion
The publicity of income tax returns in 1923 and 1924 provides a unique opportunity to
analyze individual taxpayer behavior in the interwar period. Using a sample of 11,774
matched taxpayers in New York, I have computed the elasticity of taxable income and found
it to be largely consistent with past estimates. Results are usually on the lower end of the
range of previous estimates from postwar time periods, but correspond almost exactly to
estimates during the interwar time period. Results from a regression approach for New York
are around 0.080 to 0.586, with the most trusted estimates at 0.288 and 0.387.
These elasticity estimates agree with estimates by Goolsbee, as well as Romer and Romer.
I update table 1 from the literature review as table 3, with estimates from this paper included.
This paper's estimates overlap very well with the Romer and Romer estimates, and the high
end of this paper's range corresponds to the low end of Goolsbee's range. Estimates in this
paper are far lower than those implied by Smiley and Keehn, though their research design
is not directly comparable. Additionally, the similarity of ETI estimates in this chapter to









Romer & Romer 1919-1941 full interwar
period
0.2 0.31





Smiley & Keehn 1915-1929 elasticity of
number of ﬁlers
implied >1 implied >1
Marcin 1923-1924 all matches 0.08 0.58
Marcin 1923-1924 outliers dropped
or top 500
0.28 0.38
Table 5.5.1: Estimated ETIs in previous studies
This study has also analyzed the assumption of rank preservation and found it to be a fair
assumption, though it is more appropriate at high incomes than overall. Rank preservation
could be stronger if the samples in this dataset in each year were closer in size. Previous
studies of the elasticity of taxable income that relied on rank preservation might be on strong
theoretical foundations. The empirical foundations also appear to be strong, since this paper
does not use rank preservation and computes similar estimates to two previous papers that





Appendix to Chapter II
A.1 Trends in taxation
Figure A.1.1: Taxation statistics, 1920-1929. Source: Statistics of Income
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A.2 Newspapers and disclosure
Figure A.2.1: Newspapers running local payments by aﬃliation
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Figure A.2.2: Newspapers running out of town payments by aﬃliation
Figure A.2.3: $15,000 incomes by level of disclosure
149
Figure A.2.4: $15,000 incomes by level of disclosure
Figure A.2.5: $15,000 incomes by level of disclosure
150
Figure A.2.6: $15,000 incomes by level of disclosure
151
A.3 1924 tax forms and instructions
Figure A.3.1: First of two pages of 1040, tax year 1924.
152
Figure A.3.2: First of two pages of 1040 instructions, tax year 1924.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter IV
B.1 Additional Graphs
Figure B.1.1: 1920 occupations, including none
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Appendix to Chapter V
C.1 Matching heatmaps
Figure C.1.1: Heatmap with row percentages
166
Figure C.1.2: Heatmap with column percentages
167
C.2 Graphs
Figure C.2.1: Probability density function, 1923 taxpayers, $20,000 minimum income
168
Figure C.2.2: Probability density function, 1924 taxpayers, $20,000 minimum income
169
Figure C.2.3: The percent of New York income tax ﬁlers and US ﬁlers in each income class
who are found in the dataset in 1923.
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Figure C.2.4: The percent of New York income tax ﬁlers and US ﬁlers in each income class
who are found in the dataset in 1924.
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C.3 Regression results
Figure C.3.1: First regression table. No outliers dropped.
Figure C.3.2: Second regression table. Outliers dropped. Outliers may not be inconve-
niently large discrepancies in numbers, but may actually be parents incorrectly linked to
their children.
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